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Abstract

Concerns about climate change are leading to a transformation of energy systems, including increased adoption of renewable and distributed power generation and energy
storage. Climate change is also increasing uncertainties in the environmental conditions in which electric power systems operate and increasing regional vulnerability
to extreme events. Under this variable and uncertain environment, there is a need
for research that identifies high risk vulnerabilities and that identifies technology and
policies that most effectively improve resilience. However, quantifying resilience is
hard. No single number can fully describe the resilience of a particular system, and
there is as of yet no consensus about the most effective methods for estimating the
resilience of electric power systems. This dissertation contains three core chapters
that (1) analyze energy usage and resilience in Vermont and the policies shaping the
state’s progress towards its energy goals, (2) create a framework to measure resilience
using data driven methods to conserve accuracy, model simply, and broaden the range
of events examined, and (3) quantify the effects of interdependence on power system
resilience.
Chapter 1, the introduction, provides the motivation, a literature review, and a
summary of the gaps in the literature on energy/infrastructure resilience, which this
dissertation aims to address. Chapter 2 provides a qualitative look at the resilience
elements of Vermont’s decarbonization goals and several policy action recommendations that address the decarbonization and resilience challenge. Chapter 3 presents
a new method to measure resilience starting from historical utility data. Application
of the method to the IEEE RTS 96 test case utilizing Vermont weather data suggests
that distributed solar and storage both improve resilience, and storage is a particularly valuable asset. Chapter 4 improves the method of measuring resilience from
Chapter 3 with a new approach to stratified sampling of transmission line and generator outage data to measure low probability, high impact events and a new method
of modeling and ranking the impact of interdependencies on power system resilience.
The findings from two case studies on a small and a large power system in northeastern US confirm that natural gas supply interactions can have a severe impact
on power system resilience. Finally, Chapter 5 concludes the work presented in the
previous chapters. In sum, this dissertation improves the current understanding of
energy system resilience in the face of climate change.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Climate change is changing how communities’ use energy, and the hazards associated
with climate change are changing the events our energy infrastructure must withstand.
Given increasing risk from climate-induced natural hazards, there is growing interest
in the development of methods that can quantitatively measure the resilience of power
systems. Energy systems need to be robust to these natural hazards, and able to
bounce back quickly when components are damaged. Quantifying the resilience of
power systems given a set of possible disturbances is a critical first step to improve
the overall resilience of power systems [1], and is particularly timely given the scale
of investments needed to enable the energy transition.
The academic literature on resilience originated outside of the domain of engineering. There is substantial ecological work that has contributed to the field, especially
from the perspective of social systems and ecosystems [2]. The effort toward smart
cities has embraced the resilience idea in full [3, 4]. Many of these projects focus on
social, technological, and natural systems and how they interact in forming resilience
within interdependent critical infrastructure, especially within a Food-Energy-Water
1

nexus perspective [5]. While there is ongoing debate about exactly how to define
resilience for electric power systems [6], within the field of ecology resilience is well
defined. According to [2], “resilience is the capacity of a system to absorb disturbance
and reorganize while undergoing change so as to still retain essentially the same function, structure, identity, and feedbacks." In order to understand how resilient a system
is, therefore, we need to understand both the susceptibility of that system to failures,
and the ability of that system to recover from failures.
Within the field of engineering, the pioneering work on resilience comes from civil
engineers. Due to the critical importance of designing civil infrastructure to withstand
extreme events, there is substantial research on infrastructure resilience in the civil
engineering literature. Several groups have studied the impact of weather events on
power systems infrastructure [7–9]. Others have developed sophisticated models of
interdependence among infrastructure systems [10–12]. However, understanding the
resilience of electric power infrastructure often requires a deeper understanding of
how electric power systems operate.
A number of papers suggest breaking resilience events into different phases/processes, such as initial failures, cascades through the network and recovery processes [6,
9, 13]. In power systems there is long history of valuable research into the many elements of the resilience problem, however this is often undertaken in a piecemeal
approach. Many have studied the risk of exogenous events, such as storms [14], on
the failure of power systems components. Others study the impact of multiple contingencies on power systems (e.g., [15–18]). Preliminary work, which motivated the
work in this thesis, simulated thousands of extreme contingencies to form predictive
models using network properties to estimate the vulnerability of power systems to

2

massive contingencies [19]. There is a growing body of literature regarding the processes and risk associated with how initiating outages trigger cascading failures and
thus large blackouts [20–22]. Power system restoration has been an important topic
for years [23, 24]. Motivated at least in part by recent severe resilience events, such
as Superstorm Sandy [25], Hurricane Katrina [26], and the Chilean earthquake of
2010 [27], many have proposed new methods for improving power systems restoration
processes for transmission networks [28] and for distribution networks [24].
More recently, members of the power systems community have developed metrics
for measuring resilience of the power grid [6]. A few have combined many of the
processes needed to capture resilience into frameworks to measure resilience [29–31].
Panteli et al. [29] used structural analysis techniques to provide the fragility curve
for transmission towers and measure the effect of time and space variation in stress
from natural hazards. Tan et al. [30] used optimal restoration in combination with
system hardening to optimize the components to harden. Nan et al. [31] systematically incorporated the processes of resilience into one metric, which was combined
with performance measures, and also included in the implementation steps an approach to model interactions between critical infrastructures. Methods to model the
effects of multiple hazards together have been explored and results compared with
distribution network outage data in [32]. A few studies have considered the importance of measuring the effect of distributed generation on power system resilience [33].
Chen et al. [3] use mixed integer linear programming (MILP) optimization to pick
settings of switching devices and distributed generation to form microgrids to serve
the critical loads during large disturbances in distribution grids. Farzin et al. [34]
optimize a distribution system operator control scheme to exchange power between

3

microgrids in distribution grids to enhance resilience. In recent transmission system
work [35], the prospect of islanding the transmission grid into 4 regions is explored
using a risk-based approach to choose when the system risk becomes lower for the
islanding regime.
But there are three key gaps in the existing power systems literature. First, there
is a need for additional work that models the resilience problem as a whole, providing
methods for quantitatively (and tractably) modeling each of the five processes: Stress,
Cascading, Failure, Recovery, and Analysis. Including all five resilience processes is
critical for addressing important policy questions, such as ‘what types of resources or
investments provide the most resilience value?’ Second, there is a need for resiliencemodeling methods that are driven by real data. Physics-based models including all
five processes rely on many assumptions about how systems operate, which may lead
to erroneous conclusions. Obtaining sufficiently detailed utility data is difficult, but
some real data is becoming available and is even publicly available [36]. Real-world
statistical data describing the processes of resilience offer a strong opportunity to
form a comprehensive resilience model that is directly driven by this data, which can
mitigate many of the challenges associated with the tricky modeling assumptions that
are required when real data are not available. Third, there is a need for more work on
power system resilience, which includes impacts of interdependence between critical
infrastrucutures.
In order to fill the first two gaps, preliminary work presented by the author in
the paper, “Using historical utility outage data to compute overall transmission grid
resilience” [37], quantified resilience in electric power transmission networks in a new
and comprehensive way. The paper introduced a new framework, named the Com-

4

puting Resilience Interactions Simulation Platform (CRISP), which can represent the
multiple processes of resilience. A novel aspect of this approach is the use of empirical
data to develop the probability distributions that drive the computational model. The
modular framework measures resilience by sampling from utility outage data, modeling the response of the network, and measuring the shape of the resilience trapezoid
with the amount of energy not served, the initial load shed, and event duration. The
number of line outages after a cascade are sampled from a probability distribution fit
to real data whereas the actual lines outaged are sampled from a uniform distribution. The restoration time for each line is sampled from a probability distribution of
repair times. This paper demonstrates the approach by implementing a case study to
measure the effect of added dispatchable distributed generation on the resilience of a
power system test case. The results suggest that dispatchable distributed generation
can significantly improve the resilience of electric transmission grids.
There are a number of limitations in this initial attempt [37], which, in many
ways, inspired Chapter 3 of this dissertation. For example, in the paper the cascaded
lines are chosen from a uniform distribution in the outage model. However, the lines
involved in cascades are not uniform; the next line to fail is likely to be topologically proximate to the previous line. The implementation assumes that distributed
generators will be dispatchable, whereas distributed energy resources usually vary in
their availability in time. Additionally, the implementation does not model generator
outages in the original framework.
For energy systems to be resilient, there is also a need for other critical infrastructure to be resilient, because of interdependence. Critical infrastructure (CI) is
made up of systems supplying the energy, communication, water, and food that peo-

5

ple need to survive and thrive. These systems have been built to depend on each
other, mostly for the sake of efficiency. For each of these systems to stand strong
in the face of changing conditions they must be resilient together and independently.
Back-up power generation systems enable essential services that rely on the power
grid to continue service during blackouts [38]. While the resilience of interdependent
infrastructure has been studied now for decades [39] it remains an open problem in
the literature [40–42]. There are several papers which use multi-network models as
the base to study interdependent CI [43, 44]. Much of the work in this field studies
cascading failure between interdependent infrastructures [45, 46]. Vulnerable components considering the interdependence between CI are modeled in [47]. Restoration
strategies incorporating multiple CI are studied in [43,48–50]. In the literature, there
are several studies on power systems interdependence with one other CI system. Nan
et al. [31] measured the effect of specific events on interdependent communication
and electricity infrastructure [31]. There are many ongoing challenges for modelling
the resilience of communication systems and power systems, especially within the
context of weather related resilience events within smart grids [51]. Many interdependencies between CI are changing over time, i.e., transportation and electricity
with the transition to electric vehicles increasing the interdependence between these
CIs. Indeed, benchmark problems are being formulated to encourage further research on this relationship [52]. Research on hurricanes is using weather data to fit
component failure models [53] and research on cooperative planning of CIs suggests
including interdependencies in planning will increase resilience [54]. Natural gas and
electric transmission networks interdependence is being studied not only in resilience
settings [55], but, also, under normal operating conditions [56, 57] as interconnected
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energy systems serving both heat and electricity needs [58]. Water and power networks are increasingly stressed by their interdependencies and are beginning to be
studied together [59].
As mentioned previously, the third gap in the literature is a need for better understanding of the impact of interdependence between critical infrastructure on power
system resilience. Clearly, there is substantial research studying the impacts of specific interdependencies, but very little work that helps us to understand the relative
importance of these interdependences. Thus, ranking the effects of different types
of interdependence on resilience of power systems is a useful tool to understand the
most important connections between infrastructures. Ranking can be used to prioritize which interdependencies to modify for increased resilience.
There are many ways to measure resilience of a system to power outages. No
one metric provides a complete measure of resilience; we need an array of metrics to
measure the impact of low probability, high impact events and thus further understand
resilience. Given sufficient data, the methods employed in the CRISP method to
measure resilience are directly measurable from a power system test case. One metric
of resilience used in CRISP is the distribution of the energy not served, ENS, which
is the integral of unserved load over the duration of the event. It is important to
look at the full distribution, because the tail of the distribution is where the low
probability, high impact events are included. Additionally, CRISP uses the risk of
events (probability x cost) as another measure of resilience. To differentiate between
a long duration small event and a short duration large event, CRISP also measures
event sizes (MW) and event durations (hours) and aggregates the risk from each
event into these bins. This information is displayed in a plot later referred to as Risk
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Boxes. In both metrics, CRISP assumes that the ENS is proportional to the cost.
However, this assumption is not perfect, because long duration, large scale events can
have social costs that are super-linearly related to ENS. Note that the social cost of a
blackout does not scale linearly with the duration or size of the blackout [60]. Blackout
costs are difficult to estimate, but for very large blackouts the indirect costs are much
higher than the direct costs [61]. Many mechanisms effect the relationship between
the ENS and the social and economic cost of events, i.e., the social and economic costs
of blackouts will increase if heating and transportation are electrified [62]. However,
these non-linearities are difficult to measure, and so ENS is used to estimate the cost
in CRISP.
Despite the fact that CRISP is a data-driven model, it does include a power
systems modeling element and simulates many long-duration events. Because of this
CRISP simulations require a large amount of computation. CRISP needs to simulate
many events in order to find the distribution of ENS for the distribution of events from
the transmission line outage data on the power system test case studied. As shown
in the flow diagram for one event using CRISP in Fig. 1.1, CRISP is a steady-state
model, and uses time steps of an hour (over which CRISP assumes the system reached
an equilibrium). The flow of each event including interdependencies is described in
more detail in Chapter 4. In Chapters 3 and 4, CRISP uses a linear optimization
(mixed integer in Ch. 3) to minimize the load shed to find the load that is not being
served at each time step of the simulation. The optimization, described further in
Chapter 3, maintains the constraints of a linearized, DC, power flow equations to
model the flow of electricity. This simplification of the nonlinear AC power flow
equations includes a number of assumptions [28], i.e., the real part of the admittance
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Figure 1.1: The flow diagram of the CRISP model.
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matrix is zero, and the voltage angles over transmission lines are very small, etc, and
allows the power flow equations to be solved much faster than the full AC power flow.
The optimizations in CRISP are implemented in Julia’s JuMP environment using the
Gurobi optimizer. Computations were performed, in part, on the Vermont Advanced
Computing Center. For typical runs on the IEEE 39-bus power system test case [63]
a single event ranges from 1 second to 16 seconds to simulate, whereas for the largest
case looked at in this dissertation typical runs range anywhere from an hour to a day
to simulate.
As previously mentioned, CRISP uses a data-driven method to measure event
size (MW), event duration (hours), and ENS (MWh). There are many benefits and
also some limitations from choosing a data-based method to measure resilience. By
starting from data the model is, in some ways, self validating, because the method
allows many modelling assumptions to be eliminated in favor of pulling results straight
from historical data. The data CRISP is built from is the same data that most models
would be validated from. The limitations also stem from the quality of data and from
the inherently historical nature of data. The data is limited to the past, and for those
without access to proprietary, detailed power system data the method is also limited
by the publicly available data. In addition, some experiments, such as strengthening
a few critical transmission lines, which are often optimized in physics-based models,
are not easily performed by this method. On the whole, the benefits of the datadriven CRISP approach to measuring resilience outweigh the limitations, because of
the ability to simulate many high impact, low probability events using real-world data
from historical events.
The challenges of measuring and increasing resilience in power systems cannot
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be fully described without also considering energy policy issues for particular power
system locations. The energy policy environment and the predicted energy use in the
region provide the context within which resilience can be quantified. To better describe these relationships between policy, decarbonization, energy use, and resilience,
Chapter 2 of this dissertation presents a study of energy in Vermont. Specifically,
Chapter 2 qualitatively analyzes the Vermont’s current efforts to decarbonize energy
use while increasing resilience. After describing the historical context of Vermont’s
energy policy and its effect on the current state of the energy transition, this chapter
explores the state’s current energy policies using a framework to contextualize the
incentives and requirements according to the scale of decision making called for in
the pathways to the state’s energy goals. The framework provides a picture with
which gaps in the incentive structure are identified. This chapter provides several
actionable policy recommendations at the national and state level.
The dissertation then, in Chapters 3 and 4, presents a new method for measuring
resilience of power systems using utility data, improves that method to use stratified
sampling to better represent low probability events using historical generator outage
data, and ranks the impact of interdependences on power system resilience. Chapter
3 presents an expanded CRISP model to quantify resilience in electric power transmission networks [37]. The approach includes generator outages, a better account for
the spatial spread of cascading outages, and a moving horizon optimization method
to model the restoration process. Chapter 3 includes a case study utilizing Vermont
weather data and the IEEE-RTS 96 power system network to quantify the impact
of combinations of energy storage and PV on power system resilience. Chapter 4
further extends the CRISP model, presented in Chapter 3, to include interactions
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between the power system and other critical infrastructures, to use stratified sampling to represent low probability, high impact events, which are under represented in
Monte Carlo sampling techniques, and to utilize historical generator outage data to
sample generator outages. This version of CRISP includes four interaction models:
three specific interactions (communication systems, natural gas supply, and nuclear
generator recovery) and a generic recovery model. Chapter 4 applies CRISP to rank
the 3 specific interaction models on two test cases based on the Northeastern US electric transmission network to rank interdependencies in the region. Finally, Chapter
5 concludes this dissertation and presents future work.
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Chapter 2
Decarbonization and Resilience in
Vermont: A Framework for Energy Decision Making
1

2.1

Abstract

Motivated by concerns over global climate change, energy sovereignty, and economic
trends, many regional governments, such as US states, are developing policy plans and
quantitative targets aimed at decarbonizing energy systems. Increased storm intensities caused by climate change are also motivating the need for policies to make energy
systems, in general, and electricity, in particular, more resilient to extreme events.
1
To be submitted to Frontiers in Climate Law and Policy by Molly Rose Kelly-Gorham, Paul
Hines, Gillian Galford, and Seth Blumsack.
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One of the most promising decarbonization strategies is to electrify heat and transportation coupled with deployment of low carbon power generation, such as wind and
solar. While this strategy has enormous decarbonization value, an increased reliance
on electric power systems and variable renewables, which are vulnerable to extreme
weather events, could decrease energy resilience without appropriate technologies and
policies in place. This paper, spanning several scales from federal to household levels,
describes a number of policy and technology options to jointly promote both decarbonization and resilience. Looking through the lens of our framework, the US State
of Vermont, which has historically been a leader in energy innovation, presents an
optimal case study. Specifically, the paper looks at five societal scales (federal, regional, state, municipal, and household/business), identifies gaps in existing policies
and suggests policy/technology solutions and funding mechanisms that could enable
both decarbonization and resilience for regional governments, such as Vermont. We
discuss several specific socio-technical solutions, such as federal investment in transmission infrastructure, state-wide life cycle analysis on land use change to support
energy planning, and microgrids for EV charging along highways.

2.2

Introduction

In recent years many US states have announced plans to decarbonize their economies
by the middle of the 21st century. States, large and small, have committed to ambitious goals to reduce carbon emissions by 80-85% over the next 20-30 years. Large
states have announced goals to reduce carbon emissions by 85% by 2050 (New York)
and net zero by 2045 (California). Smaller states plan to achieve 80% reduction in
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carbon emissions by 2040 (Rhode Island) and 80% reduction in carbon emissions by
2050 (Vermont). Policies such as these, along with decreasing costs, are driving rapid
growth in wind and solar energy production. Growing clean energy naturally reduces
carbon emissions, but also creates additional interdependencies between critical energy infrastructure systems and manifestations of the changing climate. Extreme
natural events, such as hurricanes, heavy precipitation winter storms, and forest
fires, are increasing in intensity and/or frequency [64], and motivating states and
cities to develop policies and technologies that increase the resilience of their energy
systems to extreme events. But deploying new technology to enable decarbonization
and resilience can be expensive. Understanding how to cost-effectively reduce carbon emissions, while also increasing the ability of energy systems to provide reliable
service, even during extreme events, is an open, critical problem.
Much motivation and a number of important lessons can be taken from recent
large-scale power outages, providing insight into the development of resilient energy
systems. Consider, for example, the winter storm in February of 2021, which left 4.5
million customers in Texas without power for days [65]. This event clearly demonstrates the need to design both power generation systems, such as gas power plants,
and fuel delivery systems, such as compressor stations, to be resilient to extreme
events, even if those events are relatively rare. A lesson can also be seen in the lack of
electric connections outside the State’s uniquely isolated interconnection [66]. Cities
in Texas connected to interconnections outside the state fared better during the cold
snap [67]. The grid in Texas, looked at from the regional scale, shows the inability to
import power when local generation sources are unavailable, and looking at the home
and business scale shows that several critical needs, such as heat and water supply,

15

are unavailable without electricity. While other states may not have the same level
of electric isolation, this same philosophy also applies to natural gas and petroleum
pipelines. California’s blackouts in the heatwaves of 2020 illustrated the potential effects of a lack of in-state generation and relying instead on supply lines which may be
vulnerable to disturbances. These blackouts stem, at least in part, from a transition
in the State’s generation away from the traditional dispatchable fossil fuel generation
to variable renewable generation [68, 69]. Looking at California from the state scale,
rather than the regional scale, illustrates this lack of local generation.
This paper introduces a framework to analyze decarbonization and resilience decision making over several geographical scales and consider the interactions among
scales. This framework is applied to the US State of Vermont, where we identify
key policy barriers and opportunities to enable both decarbonization and resilience in
the face of growing threats posed by climate change. We look at five different scales
of decision making, from the national scale to the regional, state, community, and
household scale. For each scale, in the context of the energy transition, we identify
the expected decision making (i.e., what decisions are necessary to meet State goals),
outline the incentives needed for those decisions, and identify gaps.
We use the five scales of decision making framework to examine a case study,
drawing lessons from the energy industry in a relatively small and northern (cold
climate) US state with a history of using policy to advance efficiency and clean energy. As a rural State that has limited in-state energy supply (particularly after the
shutdown of an in-state nuclear plant), faces regular storm outages, is seeing growing
wind and solar development, and has emerging challenges associated with insufficient
transmission and distribution (T&D) capacity to move renewable energy, Vermont’s
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energy transition sheds light on a number of the challenges that are likely to emerge
as colder climate regions seek to ensure resilient energy infrastructure systems, while
also moving away from fossil fuels. Furthermore, due to the cold climate and rural
character of Vermont, heat and transportation are the two largest energy uses in
the State, and this added challenge makes Vermont an excellent proof of concept for
other locations hoping to decarbonize these sectors. This framework provides a fresh
look at how policies can be leveraged over various scales for states and other regional
government organizations to enable both decarbonization and resilience.

2.2.1

Literature Review

It is now widely accepted that a transition from fossil fuels to carbon-free energy is
technologically feasible: the raw materials needed are available in sufficient quantities, there is enough primary energy available (wind, solar, hydro, geothermal, etc.)
to meet global energy needs, and the key technological barriers are solvable [70].
Within the power system community there are calls for more focus on social science
techniques in the energy field to tackle social barriers to the energy transition [71].
Indeed, there are many methods for analyzing policy mixes for the energy transition, including multiple streams analysis [72], socio-technical transitions theory [73],
and polycentric governance [74]. Markard et al. suggest that a new phase of policies
that intentionally considers the interactions between energy, social, and environmental systems are needed for the next phase of the energy transition [75]. Using a
sector-based framework, Oberthur et al. suggest a need for global governance institutions, which should set rules, provide transparency, allow for knowledge sharing, and
enforce rules [76]. A temporal analysis of China’s energy policy from 1981 to 2020
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showed that the policy mix increased in diversity and complexity as tools were added
to reduce emissions and increase renewable generation [77]. In the US, while policies and tax-incentives supporting renewable electricity production and low-carbon
transportation technologies often have little resistance at the beginning of implementation, political resistance tends to increase as new technologies begin to compete
with incumbent technologies [78].
There have been several studies using scale-based frameworks to examine energy
policy. Based on the strategic action field framework, Berlin presents an example
where small scales have a large impact on energy systems [79]. Focusing on the defined
clusters of governance at different scales and networked interactions, Hoppe et al. [80],
present a framework of regional governance in the energy transition with a case study
in the Netherlands. Stakeholder decisions compiled using Value-Focused Thinking,
Multi-Attribute Utility Theory and a clustering technique led to distill stakeholder
priorities into key attributes that aligned most stakeholders within two scenarios
for the sustainable energy transition in a case study in Germany [81]. Multi-level
governance has allowed local energy initiatives to support national and European
Union energy goals in Austria; further integration with the high level governance
could supply energy planning aid to support and improve these local initiatives [82].
Hawaii, with support at the federal level, has provided the regulatory environment
for local level experimentation to find solutions to the energy transition [83].
A number of authors have previously studied aspects of the decarbonization and
resilience challenge (DRC) or approaches to decarbonization also increase resilience.
For example, increasing the energy efficiency of buildings with better insulation not
only reduces energy use, but also increases the length of time a building can remain
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at comfortable temperatures during electricity outages, for both extreme heat or cold
cases [84]. Distributed solar and storage can improve resilience by providing backup
energy during disturbances [85], while also balancing the variability of renewables and
thereby decreasing carbon emissions. The vast majority of power outages in the US
result from outages in the medium and low voltage power distribution system [86].
Solutions deployed behind the meter, such as microgrids, and within distribution
networks can substantially improve electricity system resilience [38]. However, cost
is another clear trade-off when attempting to both increase resilience and reduce
emissions mainly through use of distributed variable renewable resources [87, 88].
Thermal energy storage may already exist in homes already and is another tool that
can be useful not only for increasing resilience, but with decarbonization, since (as
with other forms of energy storage, although with a shorter time window) it can be
used to shift demand [89].
Vermont’s history of energy innovation makes it an interesting case for energy
policy studies. Vermont’s smart grid formation, where 85% of the State’s electricity
customers received smart meters, was a collaboration across organizations of different
scales and types, (i.e., transmission utilities, distribution utilities, state government,
etc.) which increased both the salience and complexity of the current electricity
grid [90]. Siting enough renewable energy in Vermont to fill Vermont’s electricity load,
Thomas et al. [91] formulated several siting scenarios to place renewables depending
on the State’s priorities. Recent surveys from towns on Vermont’s energy polices
show that people of color and low-income households were more likely to experience
trouble heating or cooling their homes, and were less likely to obtain the subsidies
offered by the state for weatherization and solar panel installation [92].
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2.3

Vermont Case Study

Vermont has long been considered a leader in energy policy. The State’s focus on
local action illustrates the challenges of community disagreements on renewable energy development. The State is dealing with these land-use disagreements while also
contending with narrow constraints on the transmission network along with urban
and policy pressure to increase local energy production. This section presents Vermont’s energy landscape and energy policy to illustrate how one particular region is
addressing the DRC.

2.3.1

Vermont’s Energy History

Vermont has harnessed its local resources, particularly wood and waterways, to provide energy for centuries. Even today, 78% of the State’s (limited) electricity generation is produced through hydroelectric and waste wood sources [93]. In the past, Lake
Champlain and rivers were used for transportation and for energy, harnessed by factories to produce goods. Wood was the main form of heat and light before the 1900s
and remains the main heat source for 30% of Vermonters today [94]. As technology
evolved, railroads connecting Vermont to Pennsylvania brought in coal to heat homes
and run trains. In the 1900s petroleum and electricity began to serve some of the
State’s energy needs, and coal was slowly replaced with fuel oil for heating homes.
Fuel oil remains the primary source of heat for 25% of Vermont homes today [95, 96].
As of 2018, 74% of Vermont homes heat with fossil fuels, such as fuel oil, natural gas,
and propane [96].
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From its opening in 1972 until it shut down in 2014, the State’s largest single
electricity producer was a 650MW capacity nuclear generator, Vermont Yankee [97].
While Vermont has consistently been a net energy importer over the last century,
the last decade (particularly after Vermont Yankee shut down in 2014) has seen a
significant increase in Vermont’s reliance on imported energy. Vermont produces
only about 1/3 of the total electricity and the total energy used in the state [93].
In part because of the need for in-state power generation, and in part due to
state climate policy, Vermont enacted a number of policies (beginning in 1998) to
encourage in-state resources, including solar, wind, and energy efficiency. In the last
decade, distributed solar PV capacity increased from 5 to 381MW [96]. Additionally,
several large wind plants were built in the State in the last decade, bringing the
combined capacity of wind energy infrastructure from 6 to 149MW [98]. It should be
noted, however, that the largest wind plants and a significant amount of the State’s
MW-scale solar plants are located in the Northeast portion of the State, known as
the Sheffield-Highgate Export Interface, where there is limited transmission capacity.
Due to these transmission constraints, ISO New England regularly requires that these
plants curtail production to meet regional reliability constraints [99].
Federal- and state-level energy policies have not always been synchronized in Vermont. As illustrated in Figure 2.1, Vermont has been ahead of the federal energy
policies in a number of key areas. This has allowed Vermont to apply for federal
funding to demonstrate new technologies. As early as 1970 Vermont began to focus
on conserving energy with Act 250. Act 250, first and foremost a land-use bill, was
originally designed in response to increased development pressure and a desire to regulate infrastructure quality (such as sewage treatment plants). Act 250 included a
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Figure 2.1: Relevant events from the US and Vermont energy history timelines from 1970
to 2020.

requirement that new development must be “in conformance with any duly adopted
development plan" and the capability and development plan will “accomplish a coordinated, efficient and economic development of the State." [100]. A few years later,
the oil embargo spurred action at the federal level with the Energy Policy and Conservation Act of 1975. Two decades later, in response to Vermont’s lack of in-state
energy resources, Beth Sachs and Blair Hamilton in Burlington, VT founded the Vermont Energy Investment Corporation (VEIC), leading to the first energy efficiency
utilities in the US [101].
In 2000, when Efficiency Vermont (operated by VEIC) was created by the State’s
legislature, Vermont became the first State to develop a state-wide energy efficiency
utility and to treat the resulting demand reduction as a generation capacity resource
by selling capacity into the regional market, the Independent System Operator - New
England (ISO-NE). This innovation has led to more rapid adoption of energy efficiency
technology, relative to the US average, and thus Vermont’s electricity demand has
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remained closer to constant rather than increasing [102]. Efficiency Vermont remains
a key component of Vermont’s energy community. Despite Vermont’s relatively small
size and gross domestic product, it continues to provide innovative solutions to electric
grid conundrums.
Motivated by both the need for in-state energy resources and by State climate
goals, Vermont has also implemented a number of different policies to increase the
adoption of renewable energy. Vermont’s net metering program, which was first
authorized in Vermont in 1998, currently has a high cost compared with alternative
options for utilities to comply with renewable energy requirements, and therefore
the compensation for the energy from net-metering projects is decreasing [96]. The
SPEED, Sustainably Priced Energy Enterprise Development, program, which began
in 2005 used a feed-in-tariff that gives renewables the advantage of setting a certain
price for the electricity produced by the plant for a certain time frame. As is common
with most feed-in-tarriffs, the SPEED program reduced investment risks, resulting
in significant renewable energy growth [103]. Vermont introduced the standard offer
program in 2009, which has gradually replaced SPEED. Standard offer works through
requesting bids from potential generators; only the lowest cost bids are brought into
the program and utilities are required to purchase power from them. Previously the
utilities had to fund the standard offer program, but were not required to purchase
electricity from those generators for their customers. The projects in the current feedin-tarriff program, known as standard offer, includes a combined 60MW of installed
capacity, and the projects in the net metering program includes a combined 264MW
of installed capacity [96].
A renewable energy standard (RES), also referred to as a renewable portfolio
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standard (RPS), was established in Vermont in 2015 and imposes requirements on
distribution utility (DU) milestones for decarbonization of electricity with three tiers
of actions. Tier 1 is the broadest and focuses on increasing the percent of renewable
energy used as electricity sources. Tier 2 focuses on distributed energy resources,
requiring not just a percentage of distributed renewable generation is purchased by
DUs to supply to customers. Tier 3 more directly focuses on environmental impact, by
requiring DUs to either purchase additional distributed renewable energy to supply to
their customers or through distributed (i.e., customer) reduction in fossil fuel use. The
program ramps up from 2017 through 2032, when the total from the three tiers must
meet 97% of electricity demand [104]. Renewable energy credits (RECs) are produced
by renewable plants when they generate electricity, and utilities must purchase from
the renewable energy providers in order to fulfill their requirements under the RES.
The retirement of Vermont Yankee, in 2014, led to an increase in regional costs
paid by all utilites, such as generation capacity costs and regional transmission costs.
These high costs provided incentive for utilities to implement many Distributed Energy Resource (DER) policies and grid modernization initiatives.
Another of Vermont’s early energy innovations came in the form of smart grid
technology. In 2010, the State’s transmission utility, Vermont Electric Power Company (VELCO), in partnership with all 22 of the distribution utilities in Vermont,
was awarded a smart grid grant from the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act
of 2009 [90]. The grant led to the installation of smart meters in Vermont, the installation of advanced switching devices to improve reliability, and supported several
consumer behavior studies focused on understanding the impact of incentives and
technology for enabling demand response. As of 2021, more than 80% of Vermont’s
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electric customers have advanced metering infrastructure (AMI). While the State has
yet to widely deploy time-differentiated pricing, AMI has been used to enable better
outage management.
Green Mountain Power (GMP) the largest distribution utility, DU, in VT developed a Tesla Powerwall program followed by a Bring Your Own Device program,
which helps homeowners offset the cost of home energy storage in exchange for allowing GMP to use the stored energy during peaks in electricity usage [105]. Furthermore,
there are programs for demand response broadly available, such as the GMP program
that incentivizes electric vehicle (EV) owners to charge on a level 2 charger when the
grid is not stressed by offering lower electricity rates during those times and higher
rates when the grid is nearing peak use, with text notifications asking if the car owners
want to remain charging or not. Fleets of hot water heaters controlled by Burlington
Electric in a demand response pilot study have led to more sophisticated management
schemes of controlled devices and successfully moved load to fit preferred timelines of
energy use [89]. DERs for community resilience centers are also being piloted, such
as the GMP resilience center at a Rutland school [106].

2.3.2

Challenges of Resilient Decarbonization
in Vermont

In 2011, Hurricane Irene caused widespread damage in Vermont, and damaged millions ($) worth of infrastructure [107]. The damages were exacerbated by housing
located in flood-prone areas [108]. The rural nature of the State provides incentives
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Figure 2.2: Customer outage hours over several years from GMP data binned by weather
event types. Source: Northview Weather (used with permission)

for DERs, which can support consumers during power outages. Large events tend
to expose often neglected interdependencies between infrastructure systems. For example, damage to the transportation system can increase the time it takes to repair
damaged electricity infrastructure. Conversely, electricity outages can cause traffic
lights to go out, grocery store coolers to go down, water treatment plants to malfunction, etc. The changes in extreme event frequencies and magnitudes are leading to a
focus on resilience of infrastructure, which puts higher priority on the mitigation of
high impact, low probability events. Not only are ‘normal’ weather patterns changing, but the energy in storms is increasing, which suggests more intense storms in the
future [109].
Since the storms that cause the most frequent power outages are expected to be
more intense in the future, there is also potential for increased frequency of power
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outages, particularly in winter. Weather analysis for future climate scenarios in the
draft of the latest long term transmission plan from VELCO concludes that flooding
and high precipitation events are occurring at higher intensities and that the conditions for more intense storms will continue to be prevalent, especially in the late fall.
Figure 2.2 shows the cumulative hours in which customers’ electricity went unserved
in the GMP service zone, separated by event type and month from 2008 to 2019. The
clear outliers are the outages occurring in October, November and December, which
have the most unserved customer hours by far. Electricity outages are often caused
by tree limbs falling or tree failures during severe weather events, and large trees
falling onto electric lines cause long and costly outages [110]. Maintaining electricity
T&D right-of-ways by consistent tree trimming is an essential part of the resilience
strategy for reliable and resilient electricity supply.
While the US produces about as much energy as it consumes, most of the states
in the US produce less energy than they consume, and therefore need to import the
remainder from other states that produce more than they consume. As shown in
Fig. 2.3, Vermont is among a small set of states that produce less than half of the
total energy than they consume. In contrast, Texas produces twice as much energy
as it consumes; in 2012 Texas both exported and consumed approximately 11,700
Trillion BTU. Wyoming, which produced 7,117 Trillion BTU but only consumed 535
Trillion BTU of that energy, is another outlier. As with all Northeastern states,
Vermont’s heavily reliance on energy imports makes it vulnerable to disruptions.
There are multiple ways to enable resilience. However relying on only one method
to the detriment of others may reduce resilience, because diversity of mechanisms
is an important aspect of resilience. Transmission interconnections to neighboring
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chesches
Figure 2.3: Compare the energy produced and consumed in each state. Most states must
import energy, since far more states consume more energy than they produce. The red line
shows the points where energy use is equal to energy production for reference. Source: EIA

28

regions make it possible to import from neighboring regions when there is a local
shortage, which can increase resilience. But if transmission resources are used for
economic imports (relying on the trade to supply energy), the opposite effect can
occur. In this case, increased transmission interconnections may decrease resilience,
if they incentives dependence on external supply. Investing in local energy resources
may also increase resilience, by allowing local supplies to complement remote ones.
But if communities with local resources do not also maintain interconnections with
neighboring energy sources, the system is again less resilient, since systems cannot
import without interconnections. Thus, the most resilient system is likely the one
that has both local supply and strong interconnections with neighbors. However,
building redundant local resources and also interconnections is costly, and may be
seen as inefficient. And it is impossible for large electrical power systems to be 100%
immune to external disturbances and cascading failures.
If we consider all in-state generation to be a source of Vermont’s electricity, then
Vermont still only produces a third of the electricity it consumes. Economically, after RECs are considered, that fraction is further diminished; only a twentieth of the
electricity used in Vermont is purchased from in-state resources (hydro, solar, and
non-renewable). The other 95% of electricity is purchased from generators located
outside of Vermont, including 43% imported from Hydro-Quebec, 18% from other
out-of-state hydroelectricity, 27% from out-of-state nuclear, and 6.4% from the ISONE system mix [93].
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Figure 2.4: Vermont and the US GHG emissions separated by sector, with the total annual
GHG emissions in the titles. Source: VT’s Agency of Natural Resources and the EPA

2.3.3

Vermont’s Recent Decarbonization and Resilience Policy Initiatives

Estimates of Vermont’s recent carbon emissions are shown in Figure 2.4.
Transportation is the largest source of greenhouse gas emissions in the State, and
Vermont has the highest per capita average vehicle miles traveled in the Northeast.
Heating and cooling comprise the highest energy demands in the state and are a close
second to the largest source of greenhouse gases in Vermont. On the other hand, by
the State’s estimation, the electricity consumed in VT has the lowest carbon intensity
in the country [93].
Vermont has recently established aggressive policy goals related to decarbonization
and resilience. The Global Warming Solutions Act of 2020, GWSA, adds enforceable
targets to Vermont’s goal of reducing carbon emissions. Energy burden is defined as
the amount of money a person spends on energy resources divided by their income.
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The GWSA requires the State reach certain emission reduction milestones without increasing the average energy burden in the State. The Global Warming Solutions Act
requires a 26% reduction from 2005 levels by 2025, a 40% reduction from 1990 levels
by 2030, and a 80% reduction from 1990 levels by 2050. Vermont recently published
an updated Comprehensive Energy Plan, CEP, in an effort to navigate the requirements and keep Vermont on track to meet them in a beneficial way for the State’s
communities, ideally without causing much disruption. The State also published an
initial Climate Action Plan, CAP, in late 2021, which is available to the public. Because of the high carbon emissions in the transportation and thermal sectors, the
focus of the recommendations from the 2022 CEP is on encouraging greater reliance
on EVs and heating systems with low GHG emissions, along with increases in building
weatherization. For the transportation sector, the CEP focuses on electrification to
reduce carbon emissions. For example, the latest CEP recommends a goal of “a level
3 EVSE charging port ... within 5 miles of every Interstate interchange and every
50 miles along state highways" [99]. The CEP suggests purchase of electric medium
and heavy duty vehicles should carry incentives for both individuals and commercial
enterprises (like transit companies and farms) to help decarbonize transportation [99].
The 2021 CAP suggests that incentives for level 2 chargers, for EVs, and for solar
plus storage energy resources will support further decarbonization [111].
The State has invested funds towards incentives for weatherizing homes, and is
investing more to increase the rate of weatherization by 550 homes per year [112],
although this is a drop in the bucket compared with the "120,000 more homes by
2030" suggested in the annual energy plan to contribute to the emission reduction
requirement in the GWSA [93]. A clean heat standard was passed by the Vermont
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legislature, but was vetoed by the Governor. If enacted, these two policies together
could reduce the State’s thermal emissions (which emits about 30% of the State’s
GHG emissions). The Vermont Public Service Department is considering updating
building efficiency codes to require Net-zero ready new builds by 2030.
The CEP recommends grid modernization, suggesting load flexibility, consumer
markets for DERs, and continuing work on distribution grid and communication
infrastructure for better visibility for utilities and the necessary components for coordination of DERs. The CEP for 2022 suggests significant planning is needed to
coordinate between land use change groups and grid planning groups to avoid conflicting actions. The current distributed generation capacity maps are a useful start
for coordinating these efforts; however distribution utilities could be required to create two updated maps to aid project planning, which display the areas with the most
capacity in the existing electrical infrastructure for increased demand and the areas
with the most capacity for increased distributed generation. Regardless of coordinating measures, grid hardening and increases in transmission capacity will (almost
certainly) be necessary if the State electrifies a significant amount of transportation
and heat [99].

2.4

Five-Scale Decision Framework

This section introduces a framework to analyze decarbonization and resilience decision making over multiple scales and the next larger and smaller scales. As shown
in Figure 2.5, this framework looks at five different scales of decision making: the
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national, regional, state, community, and household scale. In order for states to meet
their decarbonization and resilience goals, multiple decisions need to be made at several of these scales. By examining the decisions that are expected at each scale by
the State’s pathways for meeting its’ goals, the five-scale decision framework unpacks
which of those decisions have incentives or requirements and which decisions do not,
given the current federal and State policy mix.
At each spatial scale, we use this framework to categorize decisions in the State’s
pathways to decarbonization, and look for interactions between the scales. We check
if the suggested decisions at each scale support each other or whether there are aspects
at certain scales that are changing faster than the other scales. Comparing the State
posed pathways for Vermont to confront the DRC and achieve State goals at these
five scales may yield new insights as to where policies can be better leveraged over
various scales to enable both decarbonization and resilience in Vermont.
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5 Scales of
Decision Making
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HOME/BUSINESS
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MUNICIPALITY
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STATE
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LEARN
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NATION
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chesches
Figure 2.5: An informational cartoon of the
five scales of decision making framework.
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Home /
Business

Purchase electric hot water heater
Install low carbon heating

Coordinate land use planners w/
VELCO / DUs to maximize DG
placement w/ grid capacity
Maximize renewable generation
Build generation where
demand can coordinate
Purchase EV
Enroll in DU EV rate prgm.s
Upgrade electric panel
Install level 2 EV charger
Purchase building battery
Purchase solar system
Weatherize home

State

Community

Decisions
Fund VT initiatives
Transmission upgrades

Scale
National
Regional

Clean heating standard

2032: Net zero ready

Fast EV charge, TB
DU TB
RES II
Weatherization Assistance Program
Home Energy Loan for low-income
TB
RES-III, TB

Tax break (TB)
Lower fuel cost

Less curtailment

ISO-NE enforces
reliability upgrades
3 year LRTP

Requirements

RES; 3 year IRP
RES for DUs; > 5MW
projects need ISO approval

Incentives

Table 2.1: Vermont DRC Decisions Suggested for State Pathways By Scale

Breaking down these policies into different levels/scales allows us to see if the
expected decisions will be incentivized by the current energy transition policies. Table 2.1 breaks down the decisions suggested as a path towards the State’s energy
goals in the Vermont’s 2022 CEP and incentives for those decisions, separated by the
scale of the decision making, as they are laid out in current State policy. It is clear
from table 2.1 that the emphasis of current policies is on enabling many small scale
decisions to empower Vermont’s energy transition.
Vermont’s current energy policy provides home- and business-level incentives to
help Vermonters, who can afford to, make decisions that support the State’s energy
goals, such as electrifying their home heating systems and vehicles. Incentives for cost
and carbon saving benefits for home and business owners, such as building weatherization, efficient low-carbon heating systems (wood stoves and air or ground source
heat pumps), level 2 home charging of EVs, and distributed energy resources (such as
solar plus storage) should and are being prioritized. For building weatherization, the
State has granted enough funds for over 2000 homes to be weatherized this year; once
a home is weatherized, the building is eligible for home heating upgrades through the
FEMA’s Building Resilient Infrastructure and Communities (BRICs) grant program.
Furthermore, new requirements at the home and business level to support the State’s
goals are also being considered. Net-Zero ready is one suggested requirement for new
builds by 2030. The recommendation that each building related state-wide program
include funding for 200 Amp Breakers particularly farsighted, as this will make it
easy for residents to add level 2 home vehicle chargers as they make the switch to
EVs over time.
On the municipal/community-scale, there are significant requirements on DUs,
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mainly through RES and through the 3 year Integrated Resource Plans required
by the State Public Service Department. At the state-scale, VELCO is required to
submit a new Vermont’s Long-Range Transmission Plan (VLRTP) every 3 years,
which effects the outcomes of the regional-scale decisions about transmission system
upgrades.
At the regional scale, there are interactions with the State and municipal scales
due to the requirements on Vermont T&D utilities reporting to ISO-NE. ISO-NE will
provide cost sharing over the full region, for any transmission projects necessary for
regional reliability; however, any other transmission upgrades, such as those necessary
due to local constraints on the capacity for additional distributed generation must be
paid for by the State. Although there is limited discussion of the federal-scale in the
State reports reviewed, the CEP and CAP both discuss the possible use of federal
funding for some projects, such as the BRIC program, mentioned above.

2.4.1

Gaps in Vermont’s Current Policy Mix

The challenges facing Vermont for the next few years are numerous and (unfortunately) do not all come with straightforward solutions. The deadlines for the State’s
self-imposed requirements to decarbonize are approaching faster than current adoption rates for GHG-reduction technologies. Land-use disagreements within the State
already threaten solar and wind energy generation installments. With the State’s
goals relying heavily on investing in more renewable generation and conservation of
woodlands, community support for visible energy resources will need to be grow. The
electricity transmission infrastructure currently in operation is aging and will hit ca37

pacity limits within the next decade (assuming the electrification components result in
the high load estimates from the 2021 VLRTP of 1342MW for the winter peak) [109].
Climate models suggest that storms that commonly damage distribution networks in
Vermont will increase in magnitude and frequency [109]. Decarbonizing Vermont’s
energy system while retaining or improving resilience equitably across the State will
need to be achieved within the constraints of a small state’s financial budget, given
limited federal funds.
Since Vermont has an increasingly low carbon electric system, electrifying transportation and thermal energy use will significantly reduce Vermont’s carbon footprint,
and thus plays a major role in the State’s energy plans. However, electrification will
not necessarily increase resilience. As electrification proceeds in Vermont, there will
be increasing pressure on electric utilities to ensure that the electricity infrastructure
is reliable and resilient. It is possible that increasing DERs in general, and energy
storage in particular, will increase resilience of electricity for households in neighborhoods where DERs are located. As a rural state with many customers served by long
overhead distribution feeders, relying on their personal vehicles for employment and
access to food and critical services, additional work is needed to plan for resilient
transportation electrification. This is a clear gap in recent policy; while these problems are not ignored, realistic solutions are missing. In addition, switching heat to
electricity will put additional load on the grid during extreme cold weather. Since
natural gas shortages during cold weather events are already a risk to the region [113],
natural gas plants should not be relied on to supply electricity during extreme cold.
Currently, most heating options, including furnaces supplied with fossil fuels, fail in
the event of an electricity outage. The common exception is most wood stoves, which

38

operate independent of electricity.
In the short term, Vermont as a whole has sufficient T&D capacity to serve the
additional electricity load that electrification will bring. Major transmission upgrades
can be avoided if the winter peak remains "below 1470MW and summer loads below
1210MW” [109]. Since new T&D investments are expensive and long-term projects
that impact local landscapes, stakeholders have pressured the State and utilities to
minimize the amount of new T&D construction. To enable full electrification of transportation, either significant dispatchable distribution level energy resources, load control, or transmission level infrastructure investment will be needed. A study in the
2021 VLRTP found a plausible mechanism to keep loads below these levels would
be to make sure 75% of EVs are controllable loads [109]. Along these lines, EVs
have batteries that are essentially connected to the grid when a vehicle is charging.
Vehicle-to-grid and vehicle-to-home programs that allow discharging from vehicles to
support either the grid or individual homes (such as during outages) have been piloted
in both Europe and the US, and have the potential to improve grid operation and
increase grid or household resilience [114]. In addition, enabling a rapid transition
to renewable energy will require that new renewable energy projects can be rapidly
approved and connected to the grid only where the power is needed. However, some
locations within Vermont have very limited capacity to support additional renewable
generation. There are many challenges in generation placement, such as land use
disputes, choosing plant locations that are not sequestering carbon, placing energy
resources in an equitable way, and placing and sizing those resources where the grid
has capacity for the power. This is a major gap in the State’s policy initiatives, considering the timescales usually necessary to realize transmission line projects, there
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should be far more focus on placement of DGs. For Vermont to implement transmission investments that are not considered necessary for ISO-NE system-wide reliability
those costs will necessarily come from consumers through higher electricity rates. Additional transmission infrastructure moving renewable energy more easily south and
out of Vermont would also aid other State’s energy transitions.
At the federal scale, there are large-scale infrastructure challenges, and those
challenges would be best met federally, because of the potential benefits to multiple
states. As discussed above, the pathways in the 2022 CEP left significant work to be
done on the electrification of the transportation sector, while some guidleines have
been established clear plans, such as where charging infrastructure should be, are
not clearly defined. On the household/business scale the transition is clear, in that
Vermonters should electrify; however on the municipal, state, regional, and federal
scales it is not clear where there will be sufficient charging infrastructure, so that
residents that electrify their personal vehicles can reliably travel in them. This is
a gap in the State’s plans to support the decision to transition to an EV at larger
scales.
At the state scale, due to the small scale changes that are meant to add up to
meet the State’s goals, coordination will be an essential asset. However, because
these decisions over small scale changes can’t be made at the state level they are
uncoordinated. For any chance of consideration on equity the State must provide
energy planners incentives, planning tools, or regulations to coordinate these efforts.
State-wide, consistent research which provides maps of where to equitably place energy resources and where grid capacity for those resources exists would give energy
planners a baseline for appropriate sites to pursue. Furthermore, land-use change re-
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quires community support in Vermont, due to the permitting process. To build public
support, and to better understand the most ideal land to use for generation, climate,
grid, and social needs must be considered. Life Cycle Assessments across the State
that consider grid capacity constraints, environmental concerns, and social concerns
could aid in finding the best combination of policies that could be passed with high
public approval. In addition, another gap in State policy is the lack of incentives and
requirements for DUs to prioritize adding grid resilience to winter storms, for example
grants for under-grounding lines that commonly fail in wind and ice storms.
Public acceptance of technology and land-use change is an essential part of the energy transition, especially in Vermont due to Act 250. It is also an extremely difficult,
if not impossible, task to have public acceptance across the board. However there are
documented methods that can, when implemented well, improve public perception of
needed changes. Combining policies for energy and climate with policies addressing
social and economic problems facing Vermont may increase public support, as research shows that policies combining economic, climate, and social policies increases
public support [115]. Policies that combine these problems into one package, such
as co-siting generation with affordable housing, grazing animals, or wildflower meadows for honey production or easing permitting processes to reduce costs of deploying
storage in areas where the grid needs support.
One way to integrate land-use change onto state land and integrate generation
resources with transportation, while also mitigating public perception issues, would
be to site solar and wind along highway corridors with batteries and charging stations
near rest areas. To roughly estimate the amount of land that would be needed
to support the charging needs associated with a EV-charging rest stop, we used
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data from New York State’s Thruway Authority. This data shows that 59.4 million
gallons of gasoline and diesel were purchased from plazas along New York highways
in 2021 [116]. Also, the average miles per gallon of light duty cars (27 mpg) can be
converted to the average miles per kWh of a light duty EV (3 miles/kWh). Using
data from a report written by the National Renewable Energy Laboratory, we found
that in Seattle WA one can expect 6.97 acres of fixed PV panels to produce a GWh
of energy over the course of a year [117]. We multiply that by the ratio of the average
hours of sun in a day in Seattle WA (2.80 kWh/m2 /day) to the average hours of
sun in a day in Burlington, VT (3.48 kWh/m2 /day) [118] to estimate that one will
need approximately 5.6 acres per GWh of energy production per year in Vermont.
Combining all of that information, we find the acres of PV required to support EVs
going the equivalent miles for the gasoline purchased in the New York Thruway for all
27 of the rest areas over the course of a year would be 2998 acres, which is equivalent
to 27% of Vermont’s mow-able highway roadside acreage [119]. This gives us the
amount of energy New York would need, but we want to find the acreage needed to
support one rest area in Vermont. So to find that estimate we can divide by the
number of rest areas in the New York Thruway (27) and multiply by the ratio of
Vermont’s population to New York’s population. With those assumption we estimate
the acreage of solar required to support the average energy needs of light duty vehicles
over a year at a rest area in Vermont to be 8.3 acres. That works out to about 20 ft
of margin along a 3.5 mile stretch of the highway.
At the municipal scale the 2022 CEP requires DUs to further decarbonize customers energy use in tier 3 of RES [99]. While specific local solutions will be needed
for different communities, there are some general aspects of the transition that will
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benefit most communities. There is a lack of incentives and/or requirements for these
solutions, such as siting EV charging stations and micro-grids that provide the services (heat, hot water, vehicle charging, etc.) to members of the community during
power outages. These solutions also use fewer resources and can serve more people
through investment at the community/regional scale rather than the household/business scale.
At the household/business scale there is a gap in the residents who have both the
knowledge of incentives available to them and can them access (e.g., have access to
the remaining funds needed and own their home or have a good relationship with
landlords who allow them to implement upgrades) to make use of those incentives to
support the State’s energy transition goals, particularly for low income and Black,
Indigenous, and People of Color, BIPOC, populations [92]. There is also a need to
add resilience to winter power outages into households and businesses because outages
during the winter months are more common. More incentives are necessary to bring
focus to this aspect of electrifying home heating.

2.4.2

Potential For Change

From Vermont’s early initiatives incentives for building weatherization, SPEED/ standard offer, and net metering, it is clear that there is potential to create more rapid
change with incentives. While incentives will be used as a policy tool to further
change in the future as well, they are a high cost option to accelerate progress towards the State’s requirements on lowering carbon emissions. While the full impact
of RES is not yet known, it has the potential to be a more cost effective tool to further
the State’s energy goals. Vermont also has a long history of energy collaboration, as
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noted in the case study on how Vermont added the infrastructure for the smart grid
with local utility and federal funds in a few years [120]. This effort began with utility
innovation and early regulatory action [120], as is the State’s approach to increasing
resilience while decreasing decarbonization. Vermont’s experience with Irene led to
more consideration in adaptation for transportation infrastructure in the face of natural disasters and climate change [108].

2.5

Actionable Recommendations

This section distills a list of actions that could enable decarbonization and resilience
at the different levels of society (household, community, state, regional, and federal)
with a particular focus on electrification of the transportation sector. The actions
highlighted here are chosen for their potential to fill gaps within the currently pursued
set of policies in Vermont, as discussed in the previous two sections, but are likely
to also be useful in other cold climate or less urban regions that are working to
decarbonize.
At the building level, the recommendations from the State are both numerous and
farsighted. To address the lack of incentives for adding resilience to power outages, we
suggest adding resilience directly into the building codes for new builds, for renovations/HVAC upgrades, and for rentals after a five year grandfather policy for recently
renovated units. To further increase the State’s resilience on a household/business
scale we recommend that building codes require the following: low carbon heating
systems, electricity independent back up (e.g., battery storage), strict building weath-
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erization standards, and electric panel upgrades that will support a level 2 charging
port for EVs. Funding for this will come from the home owner, but existing incentives, such as from the weatherization assistance program and from the home loan
programs, will provide support to low-income home owners. Building weatherization
helps to mitigate the risk of power outages in the high electrification scenario for
Vermont households, and we, therefore, recommend it be the first priority.
At the community level, ideally individuals will come together in their neighborhoods, cities, and towns to find solutions for the local area to contribute to State
goals and retain or increase their community resilience. With the increasing risk of
storm-caused electricity distribution network outages, solar plus storage with microgrid capabilities has the added bonus of improving resilience as well. One of the
clear tools to support both community resilience and decarbonization for the State
are resilience centers with energy resources, as piloted by GMP in a Rutland school.
Resilience centers using pre-existing community buildings, such as schools, hospitals,
libraries, churches, etc., could provide energy resources, heated space during emergencies, and supply clean water to support the community through (at least) medium
duration electricity blackouts. Adding requirements on utilities to have resilience centers available to customers during outages would help fill the gap at the community
level for resilient solutions after electrification or thermal and transportation needs.
If utilities are required to provide and maintain resilience centers for their customers,
but do not have the staff available to accommodate those requirements, community
scale net metering could be used to compensate a community or company that fulfills that role. Incentives from the State for (general) resilient back-up solutions (that
work during power outages) to critical services, for example wood stoves and indepen-
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dent clean water supply systems in community resilience centers, could also provide
support. The energy storage at these centers could be used for grid services during
"normal" times as well to bolster the area’s energy efficiency. The majority of residents
in NE are willing to pay for resilience to long duration outages [121]. Utilities could
continue to support community resilience, using the payment for resilience to fund
the community resilience centers or community level net metering to incentivize the
centers. Financial support at the federal level is available from the Hazard Mitigation Grant Program for Vermonters. In flood prone areas, FEMA’s Flood Mitigation
Assistance grant program can support infrastructure developments such as high elevation/raised distributed energy resources and charging stations for EVs. These can
be used during flooding events to supply power when the distribution grid is down,
and also during "normal" operations to support the grid.
There is significant support at the state level to move forward in the energy transition and to meet the requirements that the legislature passed for lowering greenhouse
gas emissions. To cost-effectively and timely execute an energy transition that reduces damage to Vermont’s natural ecosystems, provides community support, and
meets the State’s goals there must be a state-wide plan identifying the best locations
for the necessary resources. Life cycle assessments (LCAs) over the State are necessary to determine both the locational value of these resources and the locational
cost of changing land use to support or install these resources. LCAs include the
oxidation of biomass, aeration of soil, and reduction in carbon sequestration due to
deforestation. LCA can be used to enable policy makers to quantify the long-term
social and financial impacts of decisions, rather than merely looking at short-term
financial costs [122]. These assessments can be made publicly available to comple-
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ment the already suggested maps for grid capacity for additional distributed energy
resources to help land use change advocates and energy planners to find the best locations to place energy resources. The funding for this extensive planning effort would
come from a combination of State decarbonization funding (e.g., GWSA) and federal
infrastructure and hazard mitigation (e.g., BBB, FEMA). As the largest source of
greenhouse gas emissions, transforming transportation will need to be a huge component of the State’s GHG emission reductions. The plan to tackle transportation is
mainly built on electrification. Coordination of the location of charging stations for
EVs is a state-wide challenge. A new state-level tax on cars, based on their estimated
life-time emissions, can be used to provide grants for emergency distribution level
solar and storage located along highways at rest areas. The storage can be used to
provide support for the grid during non-emergency high (and low) demand and to
provide energy for transportation. The rest areas could be operational as a microgrid
during emergencies to charge EVs. Profits from the use of charging infrastructure
can be reinvested into further development of the sites, so the number of charging
stations supported by the station grows over time as the number of EVs in the area
grow.
Some aspects of the State’s transition would benefit multiple states may be more
appropriately addressed at the regional or federal level. One crucial example of this is
building out new transmission within the State and the region, which will be essential
if electrification occurs not only in Vermont, but also across the region. The recently
enacted Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act (US H.R.3684) is an opportunity to
invest in interstate infrastructure. Although there is some funding for this purpose
within Vermont H.R.3684, the proposed funds would not fully cover this expense.
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At the federal level, one option to generate revenue to invest in solutions to the
DRC, such as transmission investment, would be to monetize the many federally
owned distribution level assets and generator assets. Just as interstate highways are
provided federal funding, interstate electricity transmission could be too.

2.6

Conclusions

This paper introduces a five-scale framework that allows us to understand DRC, and
uses that framework to study the state of Vermont’s energy transition. We focus
on policies and key decisions related to decarbonization and resilience, as suggested
in several State reports, that span across five societal scales (home, municipality,
state, region, and nation), and accounts for interactions between scales. This analysis
illuminated gaps in the policies supporting Vermont’s energy transition at the state
and and federal scales.
Vermont has the opportunity to take action, not only to reduce the GHG emissions of the State, but also to increase the self-reliance of its communities. The gaps
found between the recommended policies and the State’s goals include an insufficient
plan to tackle transmission challenges, insufficient tools to incentivize optimal land
use change, and a need for further mitigation of the potential decrease in resilience
of thermal and transportation sectors after electrification. Our actionable recommendations based on our analysis of Vermont’s energy transition include the following:
upgraded building code requirements (requiring weatherization, low-carbon heating
systems, electric panel upgrades, and fast charging), state-wide microgrids with EV
charging stations at rest stops, and a national scale transmission infrastructure in-
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vestment using funds from selling off generation and distribution level assets.
This case study is particularly relevant to areas where the majority of the energy
is currently imported and where both decarbonization and increased resilience are
priorities. Many ideas that address the DRC in Vermont can easily apply to these regions, such as community resilience centers, incentives for electrification technologies
available to individuals, and policies that require DUs to reduce not only the carbon
emissions of electricity sources, but of their customers without strict mechanisms for
how this must be achieved.
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Chapter 3
Using Utility Outage Statistics
to Quantify Improvements in
Bulk Power System Resilience
1

3.1

Abstract

CRISP is a new high-level statistical approach driven by utility data to quantify
resilience in electric power transmission networks. We extend CRISP to model energy
storage, photovoltaics, and generator outages, to account for the spatial spread of
cascading outages, and to optimize the restoration process. Illustrative results show
how CRISP can measure the resilience impact of combinations of energy storage and
1
Published: Kelly-Gorham, M., Hines, P.D.H., Zhou, K., and Dobson, I. Using utility outage
statistics to quantify improvements in bulk power system resilience. Electric Power Systems Research, 189 (2020). https://doi.org/10.1016/j.epsr.2020.106676

50

photovoltaics on a power system.

3.2

Introduction

As the bulk electric power system changes in response to climate change, more extreme
weather, and new technologies, there is an increasing need to quantify its resilience
to extreme events. For example, distributed variable energy resources are increasing
and we need to quantify their effect on the resilience of power systems. Similarly,
with the rush to add energy storage, it is important to ask if storage can support
power system resilience. Recent natural disasters show the importance of resilience of
critical infrastructure; hurricane Dorian leaving the Bahamas flooded and in crisis is
just one recent example of the devastating effects of natural disasters [123]. Another
good example of the effects of extreme weather is the recent record snow falls in
Montana causing power outages and road closures.
CRISP stands for Computing Resilience Interactions Simulation Platform, and is
a new framework to quantify resilience of transmission networks that was initiated
in [37].
CRISP is:
• a high-level and comprehensive model of all phases of resilience, encompassing stress, cascading, failure, recovery, and analysis. This allows quantification of the overall risk of different threats and the overall benefits of mitigations.
• driven by utility data that describe the statistics of the overall outcome of the processes in the resilience phases. This high-level statistical
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modeling is different than modeling the details of the process in a particular
resilience phase, and avoids many of the difficulties of detailed modeling and its
validation. CRISP is driven by data already routinely available to utilities, and
each utility would use their own data to apply CRISP.
• simulated by sampling events from the statistical modeling of CRISP to
obtain probability distributions of resilience outcomes, impacts, metrics, and
risk.
In [37], CRISP samples lines out after stress and cascading from utility data,
models the response of the network as the recovery proceeds according to utility
data, and measures the shape of the resilience trapezoid with the amount of energy
not served, the load shed, and event duration. The number of line outages after
cascading are sampled from a probability distribution fit to real data and the actual
lines outaged are sampled with equal probability. The restoration time for each line
is sampled from a probability distribution of repair times obtained from real data. A
case study shows the effect of distributed generation on resilience metrics.
In this paper, we extend the previous modeling in CRISP in the following ways:
• Photovoltaics are modeled, including their daily variation. Capacity factors
and irradiance modeling are driven by utility data in an hourly time frame.
• Energy storage is modeled.
• Distributed generation now varies over time more realistically.
• Load variation over time is modeled.
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• Restoration is optimized by jointly optimizing the generation, storage and
load shed over a receding time horizon to model their deployment.
• Generator outages and ramp rates are modeled.
• Cascading line outage spread modeling is improved. The spreading now
matches the statistics from utility data in [124] of network distance between
cascading lines.
These improvements make CRISP more realistic and significantly extend the range
of its resilience quantification. In particular, the improvements enable us to assess
the impact on overall resilience of storage, distributed generation, PV, and their
time variations. Thus, this paper applies the revised CRISP model to the problem
of evaluating the impact of PV and storage on grid resilience, with the goals of
understanding, validating and improving the model.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section II reviews the literature on
other approaches to quantifying resilience. Section III summarizes the methods for
the new formulation and the utility data used, Section IV discusses the case study and
the case load and PV data, Section V presents the results of the case study, Section VI
discusses the impacts of these results, and section VII concludes the paper.

3.3

Literature review

There is considerable interest in quantifying resilience, and this section reviews relevant literature. Resilience is the ability of critical infrastructure to maintain, to a
limited extent, critical services during disasters [33]. The power systems community
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has been making progress towards finding metrics to appropriately measure resilience,
especially in a risk based approach. Alvehag et al. create a reliability model for distribution grids under severe weather which accounts for weather uncertainties and
considers the effect of severe lightening and wind storms across a test case [32]. One
way to measure the impact of an extreme event is with a resilience trapezoid, the
area of which indicates the size or cost of the event [6]. Panteli et al. [29] use fragility
curves of power system components to high winds and simulate wind conditions based
on rough regional wind patterns in the UK. Further work in [125] evaluates the severity risk index and the amount of load shed for 4 regions using the RTS24 network
over a full year, as well as simulating events to find the load shed and the average
error in the severity risk index for the different seasons and regions. In addition
to the resilience literature within power systems, there are a number of papers that
combine power system modeling with interdependence between other critical infrastructures [11,13,31,40]. For example, Antenucci et al. [126] propose a model that uses
the constraints on the gas network as constraints in the security constrained energy
reserves.
There is broad agreement that modeling resilience involves different phases, such
as vulnerability, failure, cascading, and recovery. Most of the existing literature focuses narrowly on some subset of these phases. There is significant work on system
vulnerability to events [14, 18, 127]. Fang et al. [128] identify critical components
of power systems through vulnerability analysis using attacker-defender interdiction
methods, and optimize to pick the best components to harden before wind storms.
Cascading failures in power systems has a rich literature, and still has open research
challenges [20, 21, 129, 130]. Some cascading failure work explores cascades across
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interdependent infrastructures [46]. Power system restoration research has a long history [23] and recent authors have proposed a number of more sophisticated modeling
methods for studying restoration [28, 30]. Recent work [131] shows that the distribution of transmission line restoration times has a log-normal heavy tail. Others
show that new bottom-up restoration processes are needed given high penetrations
of distributed variable energy resources [132].
A few studies measure the effect of distributed generation on power system resilience [33]. Chen et al. [3] use MILP optimization to pick settings of switching
devices and distributed generation to form microgrids to serve the critical loads during large disturbances in distribution grids. Farzin et al. [34] optimize a DSO control
scheme to exchange power between microgrids in distribution grids to enhance resilience. Recent transmission system work [35] explores islanding the transmission
grid into 4 regions to lower the system risk.

3.4

Modeling

3.4.1

Overview

Resilience to a disturbance includes the following five processes: stress leading to
initial failures, cascade of failures through the network, finding the post-disturbance
degraded system state, restoration, and quantifying the resilience of the network to
that event [37]. In order to quantify the resilience of the network it is important
to find the resilience to many events from each of the hazards that the network is
susceptible to. We measure the resilience of a power system to a particular event by
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the total energy not served.
A notable improvement to the CRISP modeling is the use of cascading distance
statistics in the selection of lines to outage in events with multiple line outages. The
modular nature of CRISP makes the framework flexible to easily allow different outage
distributions and restoration models. This also makes CRISP easy to implement on
different networks with different statistics. We note that the statistics driving CRISP
are routinely collected by utilities so that the approach can be easily implemented in
industry. In Figure 3.1, we show the processes that create the events and where data
enters the restoration loop. CRISP relies on random sampling of the distributions
modeling the outcomes of the resilience processes. The main CRISP outputs are
the probability distributions of the energy not served, the initial load shed, and the
recovery time.

3.4.2

Outage and cascading processes

The line outages that make up the various contingencies and the recovery time of
each line outage are chosen based on distributions derived from data from a large US
utility [124, 131, 133].
The cascading outages are modeled first by sampling the total number of outages,
and then sampling which lines are outaged. As described in [37], the total number
of cascading outaged lines is sampled from the Zipf distribution model obtained from
the data in [133]. These cascading line outages are then successively located on the
grid in order to match a statistic that describes how far cascades spread, as we now
explain.
The network distance between lines Li and Lj is defined as the minimum number
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Figure 3.1: Diagram of the CRISP model of a single event with cascading failures, generator
outages, and the input time dependent data used in the restoration process.
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Figure 3.2: Distribution of network distances between pairs of lines in the same cascade
from historical data.

of buses in a network path joining Li to Lj . The network distance can be thought
of informally as the minimum number of network “hops" to pass from one line to
another along the network. For example, the distance of a line to itself is zero and
the distance of a line to a neighboring line with a bus in common is one. Figure 3.2
shows the distribution of network distance between one line in a cascade and other
lines in the same cascade. The distribution of Figure 3.2 is obtained by computing all
the pairwise network distances in each of the cascades in the data of [133], processed
into cascades according to [134], and using the network generated from this data
according to [124].
The procedure starts by choosing the first outaged line at random on our case
study network. If the total number of cascaded lines is one, we are done. If the total
number of cascaded lines is more than one, then we apply the distribution of Figure
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3.2 to successively choose the other outaged lines. We choose at random one of the
lines Li that is already outaged, sample a network distance ρ from the distribution
of Figure 3.2, and locate on the network a non-outaged line that is network distance
ρ from Li . If there is no such line available on the network, we resample until such a
line is found; if there are several such lines available, we choose one at random. This
procedure approximates an aspect of the statistics of a typical spread of cascade on
the network. It is a fast, approximated, and data-driven procedure that improves on
our previous work sampling the cascaded lines at random [37]. Further improvements
in quickly approximating at a high-level samples of the spread of cascades in networks
will require more sophisticated statistical data-driven models or a better understanding of how real cascades spread in networks.2 Although we do not at present have
access to data on generator outages, we include the effect of them in the model by
using a discrete geometric distribution with the rate parameter set to 1 to determine
the number of generator outages in an event. The model samples from a uniform
distribution to choose the specific generators to outage. Once the G generators have
been selected, the same restoration time distribution used for the lines is applied to
the tripped generators. (If there is access to data on generator outages, this should
be replaced with the generator restoration time distributions.) Note that we do not
include distributed generation, which is added to the case in later experiments in the
set of generators that are allowed to fail.
2

While detailed cascading simulations include some of the mechanisms for cascading, and a few
simulations can be tuned to reproduce particular blackout sequences, there is no simulation that is
validated to reproduce the typical statistics of the spread of cascading on the network.
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3.4.3

Restoration process

The times for the restoration of lines are sampled from a log-normal distribution fit
to transmission line restoration times observed in [37, 131]. Note that these statistics
describe the outcome of line restoration processes. A receding horizon load shedding optimization determines the initial load shed in the system. The load shed is
minimized at each time step as the restoration process continues using the receding
horizon load shedding optimization. The formulation of the restoration receding horizon is:

Variables: P dd,k , P ss,k , Es,k , P gg,k , θk
min

K
X
k=1

e−rk

X

Cd (P dd,k − P dd,k )

(3.1)

d∈D

s.t. 0 ≤ P dd,k ≤ P dd,k

∀k ∈ K, d ∈ D

− P ss ≤ P ss,k ≤ P ss

∀k ∈ K, s ∈ S

(3.2)
(3.3)

Es,k = Es,k−1 − P ss,k ∆t ∀k ∈ K, s ∈ S

(3.4)

0 ≤ Es,k ≤ Es

(3.5)

∀k ∈ K, s ∈ S

− Rg ∆t ≤ P gg,k−1 − P gg,k ≤ Rg ∆t
∀k ̸= 1 ∈ K, g ∈ Gk ⊆ G
0 ≤ Pg,k ≤ ug,k P gg,k

∀k ∈ K, g ∈ G

(3.6)
(3.7)

(Bk θk )[b] = P gk [b] + P sk [b] − P dk [b]
∀k ∈ K, b ∈ Bus, g ∈ Gk ⊆ G, s ∈ S, d ∈ D
− Pf t ≤

1
θf t,k ≤ Pf t
Xf t
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∀k ∈ K,f t ∈ Lk ⊆ L

(3.8)
(3.9)

where k is the time step, K is the number of timesteps, r is the parameter of the
exponential decay, D is the set of demands, Cd is the cost of shedding load, P dd,k is
the load d served at time k, P dd,k is the demand d at time k, P ss,k is the storage
power (note that if discharging Ps,k will be positive), P ss is the maximum power
capacity of the storage, S is the set of storage devices, Es,k is the energy of storage
asset s stored at time k, Es is the energy capacity of the storage asset s, Rg is the
maximum ramp rate of the generator g, P gg,k is the power produced by generator g
at time k, Gk is the set of available generators at time k, G is the set of all generators,
u is a matrix of binary values which allows only the generator g to produce power
at time k if ug,k = 1, P gg,k is the capacity of the generator g at time k, Bk is the B
matrix for the line configuration at time k, θ[k] is the voltage angle of the buses at
time k, Bus is the set of buses, Pf t is the power flow rating of the line from bus f to
bus t, f t is the branch from bus f to bus t, Lk is the set of branches that are active at
time k, and L is the set of all branches. Note that distributed generation is included
in the vector of generators shown above.
The objective function (3.1) minimizes the amount of hourly load shedding over a
2-day period with higher weights on the most recent times. The weight on the total
load shed for time step k in the objective function is e−rk ; for our model we set r to 1.
Constraint 3.2 keeps demand served between 0 and the total demand for each time k in
the restoration model. Constraint 3.3 keeps battery charging and discharging within
each battery’s power limit. Constraint 3.4 updates the energy level of batteries at time
k based on the energy level at the previous time step and the charging or discharging
of batteries in the current time step. Constraint 3.5 ensures battery energy levels
remain within the energy rating and 0. Constraint 3.6 enforces generator ramp rates.
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Constraint 3.7 prevents unavailable generators supplying power, and limits available
generators to their power capacity. Constraint 3.8 ensures power balance at each bus.
Constraint 3.9 limits the line power flows to the line capacity.
The restoration times realized from the empirical distribution are used to update
the status of the lines and generators in the grid. Formulating ahead of time which
generators are shut down during the outage in the restoration process enables the
use of a linear program for receding horizon optimization with a binary input to the
model in the form of the matrix, u, made up of elements ug,k as shown in (3.7), which
is NG by NT , where NG is the number of generators and NT is the total number of
time steps in the time horizon. The technique ensures that generators only turn on
after the full shut down and start up times elapse without drastically increasing the
solve time by keeping the optimization a linear program. The input matrix, u also
stops damaged generators from turning on until they recover and start up. CRISP
updates which lines are operational by rebuilding the B matrix for each time step, in
(3.8), and only adding power flow constraints for operational lines for each time step,
in (3.9). The model uses time dependent upper limits on the variable constraints for
the served load and the supplied power from the added PV to implement the varying
load and PV capacity, as shown in (3.7). We solve the linear program optimization
in julia’s JuMP environment with the Gurobi solver. Note that although we have
not studied the scalability of the model to larger test cases, the model is linear and
therefore can be expected to scale reasonably well. The output of the receding horizon
model is the network state at the first time step within the optimization.
After the restoration period, the load shed is integrated with respect to time
to measure the area representing the total energy not served over the outage and
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restoration processes. Then CRISP is repeated many times over different disturbances
of the power system test case to quantify resilience in the form of the probability
distributions of the energy not served, the initial load shed, and the recovery time.
For the case study described below, over the full event and each of the tested networks
the CRISP model runs generally in the 2 to 30 minute range on a home laptop, the
average run time over 15 tested events was 9 minutes. Please note this is academic
quality code, and was not optimized for speed.

3.5

Case Study

To illustrate an application of CRISP modeling, we ask what effect on resilience does
the addition of PV and/or storage have on the grid during storms. Our inspiration
is winter storms in Vermont, which are in the part of the year with fewer hours of
production for PV and are often at night. For comparison, we also look at a sunny
day. We chose to use PV and storage as the distributed technologies in this paper, due
to their increasing economic feasibility and the availability of data. In future we would
like to to explore other technologies for their impacts of added resilience to the grid,
such as combined heat and power, flywheels, and small scale wind. The distributed
generators and storage are assumed to have microgrid-creating capabilities and are
not included in the simulated cascading outages. The distributed energy and storage
only affect the restoration process.
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3.5.1

Demand and solar data

The demand data which we use to produce variable load is from Vermont in 2013 [135].
Each demand is varied hourly based on the aggregate percent of load from the data,
and the percent of load is found by normalizing the aggregate load by the yearly peak.
To include the effect of PV, we use a subset of the normalized solar PV data from [136]
and only use one location within New England from 2013. Although the PV data is
hourly, the capacity factors come from the instantaneous value of the normalized solar
PV. The maximum power produced by the introduced distributed PV is derived from
this normalized solar PV data from the same time period as the Vermont load data.
We chose to start the model at the beginning of the year, on a January evening that
leads on to an overcast day. As a comparison, we also ran the same set of events where
the load and solar data begin during a sunny day, 3824 hours into the year. We do
not model the effects of transients within the transmission network on the behavior of
inverter connected assets in this work, and we assume islanding/microgrid capabilities
for these devices.

3.5.2

Case data

The cases examined here are based on the 73 bus RTS-96 case [137]. However, the
solar, wind, or storage resources from that case are not included in order to better
estimate the effect of only the distributed resources added as described below. Due to
the very high reliability of the original case, the load was doubled to allow resilience
effects to become more apparent3 . The case is made n − 1 secure to line outages by
3

This load increase was found by maximally increasing load (and some line limits as necessary)
while maintaining n-1 security.
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removing a single line and adjusting the line limits if any load is shed to solve the
load flow until there is no load shed. This process is repeated until every line in the
network has been removed and the line limits adjusted as necessary. Two parallel
lines are added for instances when increasing line limits was insufficient to serve the
full load. The combination of increasing the case loading and making the case n − 1
secure is done in an effort to reproduce the effect of operating the grid close to the
n − 1 secure limit.
For the experimental question, several variations on this test case are created with
added PV generation and/or storage with a power capacity equal to a chosen percent
(5% or 20%) of the demand at each load bus. The storage energy capacity is set to
supply 3 hours of power at the power capacity. Cases with each possible combination
of these amounts of PV and storage are analyzed. It should be noted that the model
exposed each case to the same set of outages and recovery times in order to confidently
compare the responses. Since our model is stochastic, and the effect of one event on a
network is not a good measure of its resilience, we simulate 10,000 events to find the
distribution of outcomes. CRISP measures the energy not served of each blackout in
units of MWh. Note that many of the initiating outages lead to 0 MWh of unserved
energy.

3.5.3

Measuring Resilience Risk

To better understand the resilience of the cases, we examine both size and time dimensions of resilience events. It is helpful to break the events into categories of small and
large events in terms of the amount of load shed at the end of the cascade and short
and long events in terms of the recovery time from the cascade [37]. Figure 3.3 [37]
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Figure 3.3: Visualizing the relative contribution to resilience risk from blackouts of different
sizes and durations. The area of each rectangle is proportional to the blackout risk in
each category. This figure separates blackouts along two dimensions: blackout size (load
lost, customers unserved) and blackout duration. Size and duration inversely correlate with
probability: Small (or short) blackout are relatively frequent and large (or long) blackouts
are rare. Because risk is the product of probability and impact, the risk from blackouts of
different sizes is frequently similar.

provides one way to visualize the contribution to the resilience from these two different dimensions. The event duration is the time between the beginning of the event
and the time at which the restoration of the load shed reaches zero with a tolerance
of 10−4 MW. The cut off between small and large events and short and long events is
chosen to make the magnitude of the squares of the base case as equal as possible. For
this test case the cutoffs are 1000 MW for event size and 1 hours for event duration.
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3.6

Results

The case study improves the base case by adding PV and/or storage. In order to find
the distribution of energy not served, we measure energy not served over 10,000 model
runs starting on an overcast night and a sunny day, and then compare the test cases
designed to address the question: What is the impact of distributed energy resources
in the form of PV and storage on the resilience of the test case? The distributions of
energy not served from the simulated events on seven cases are succinctly displayed in
the log space plots shown in Figures 3.4–3.6 and 3.7–3.9. Note that where the curves
intersect the x-axis, e is the fraction of events with nonzero energy not served, so the
fraction of events that led to zero energy not served is 1 − e. Figures 3.4 and 3.7
show the effect of adding distributed storage to the test case on an overcast evening
and a sunny day respectively. Added storage clearly results in a reduction in the
number of the events with energy not served at each size. Figures 3.5 and 3.8 show
the effect of adding PV to the test case on the distribution of energy not served on
an overcast night and a sun-filled day respectively. There is minimal to no effect on
the resilience to events beginning at night in the winter from the added PV and a
smaller but notable increase in resilience for the case with PV added with a capacity
of 20% of the load on a sunny day, particularly for large events. Figures 3.6 and 3.9
show the effect of added distributed PV with 20% of the load covered by the capacity
of distributed storage for all three cases. The effect of the PV is again small, with no
effect during the evening events and small increases in resilience during the day-time
events. Figures 3.10 and 3.11 show the resilience risk for 7 different cases at night
and during the day respectively, with each color representing the cumulative risk of
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a different subset of events. It is clear that storage decreases the risk, and increases
the resilience to winter events, and PV has little effect for these events. Adding PV
decreases the risk on sunny days, although the effect is smaller than the storage.

3.7

Discussion

This work uses probability distributions derived from real utility outage data to quantitatively measure the resilience of an n − 1 secure test case based on the 73 bus RTS
system. The results show the effects of adding PV and/or storage to the test case
on either an overcast evening or a sunny day. As seen in Figures 3.4 and 3.7, even
adding a relatively small proportion of the load in storage improves the resilience of
the network to both small and large events. When storage is added to the system,
many initiating disturbances result in zero energy not served. During extremely long
events, storage will no longer have an effect, unless it can be recharged.
As seen in Figures 3.5, 3.8, 3.6, and 3.9, adding PV to the test case is substantially
less beneficial, relative to the results due to additional storage. This is quite different
from previous results which show that adding distributed generation can substantially
increase the resilience of transmission networks [37]. However, these results should
be viewed in the context that, for Figures 3.5 and 3.6, the solar (and demand) data
is from New England and begins during the night. For disturbances that last only a
few hours (which appears to be all of them in this set samples), the cases with added
PV will have nearly identical energy not served as the base case. Figures 3.8 and 3.9
show that PV does increase resilience on sunny days, although not to the extent of
storage. Since even during the sunny day the peak available power is approximately
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Figure 3.4: The CCDF of energy not served of 10,000 events on a winter night for the test
case with 0%, 5% and 20% added storage. Storage adds resilience.

Figure 3.5: The CCDF of energy not served of 10,000 events on a winter night for the test
case with 0%, 5% and 20% added PV, and does not add resilience.

Figure 3.6: The CCDF of energy not served of 10,000 events on a winter night for the test
case with the base case, 20% added storage, and 0%, 5% and 20% added PV. PV doesn’t
contribute to the resilience for these events.
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Figure 3.7: The CCDF of energy not served of 10,000 events on a summer day for the test
case with 0%, 5% and 20% added storage.

Figure 3.8: The CCDF of energy not served of 10,000 events on a sunny day for the test
case with 0%, 5% and 20% added PV. While less effective than storage, added PV on a
sunny day does contribute to resilience.

Figure 3.9: The CCDF of energy not served of 10,000 events for the test case with 0% and
20% added storage and 0%, 5% and 20% added PV. Note that the PV contributes a small
amount to the resilience for these events.
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80% of the capacity of the PV panel while the storage can operate at it’s power limit
if it has the energy available these results are reasonable. The fact that there is no
improvement to the test case for events occurring at night when the PV is added
and that there is improvement for events beginning during the day is reasonable, and
suggests that CRISP can capture the resilience impact of variable distributed energy
resources.
We expect that the variable availability of PV will cause it to have a larger effect
on longer events lasting several days. This leads us to consider the sampling methods
used in this study. 10,000 events were sampled, but very few of those events have any
energy not served. The Monte Carlo sampling method does not focus on the tail of
the distribution of events, and therefore an extremely large number of events must
be sampled to find the impact of different solutions on the resilience to these large
events.

3.8

Conclusions

This work improves the CRISP data-driven statistical method [37] to quantitatively
measure the overall resilience of power systems. This paper reports on improving
CRISP to include models of PV, energy storage, load variation, optimized restoration, and more detailed models of generator outages and ramping. We approximate
the effect of line outages spreading on the grid by using utility data describing the
statistics of distances between lines in cascades.
CRISP samples from probability distributions obtained from utility data to describe outcomes of the stages of resilience and calculate the distributions of energy
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Figure 3.10: The categorized risk for small and large, and short and long events for 7 cases
as labeled, for events on a winter night.

Figure 3.11: The categorized risk for small and large, and short and long events for 7 cases
as labeled, for events on a sunny day.
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not served, the initial load shed, and the event duration. Variations from the base
case simulation can then be explored to quantify their effect on resilience. In this
paper we vary the distributed PVs and storage to study the effects of these assets in
increasing resilience.
Our results suggest that CRISP is able to quantify the resilience impact of distributed energy technologies such as PV and storage. The results suggest reasonable
conclusions, such that the addition of distributed PV and storage (without retiring
conventional generation) can enhance resilience, and that for shorter events, this improvement is only available for distributed solar during sunny time periods. Our
results show the importance of flexibility in a distributed grid, and suggest that grid
improvements with distributed storage have a much larger impact than improvements
with PV when the events take place at night on a cloudy winter day.
Since CRISP is a new approach to high-level simulation and quantification of
resilience, there is considerable scope to further improve its data, sampling methods,
and the range of models and effects represented. In particular, we would like to
improve the sampling methods to efficiently find the rare but high impact large events
in the tails of the distributions.
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Chapter 4
Ranking the Impact of Interdependencies on Power System
Resilience using Stratified
Sampling of Utility Data
1

4.1

Abstract

It is well known that interdependence between electric power systems and other infrastructures can impact energy reliability and resilience, but it is less clear which
particular interactions have the most impact. There is a need for methods that
1
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can rank the relative importance of these interdependencies. This paper describes
a new tool for measuring resilience and ranking interactions. This tool, known as
Computing Resilience of Infrastructure Simulation Platform (CRISP), samples from
historical utility data to avoid many of the assumptions required for simulation-based
approaches to resilience quantification. This paper applies CRISP to rank the relative importance of four types of interdependence (natural gas supply, communication
systems, nuclear generation recovery, and a generic restoration delay) in two test
cases: the IEEE 39-bus test case and a 6394-bus model of the New England/New
York power grid. The results confirm industry studies suggesting that a loss of the
natural gas system is the most severe specific interdependence faced by this region.

4.2

Introduction

There are many known interdependencies between bulk power systems and other
critical infrastructure (CI) systems that impact energy resilience. But which interdependencies are most important? To the authors’ knowledge, this question remains
unanswered (and mostly unasked). This paper presents a method to rank the effects
of several interdependencies on the resilience of a power transmission system based
on data collected by electric utilities.

4.2.1

Motivation

Extended, large power outages come with very high social costs. It is well known,
but not particularly well quantified, that these costs are exacerbated by interdependence between CI systems. Communication towers, traffic lights, water filtration
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and supply systems, and even natural gas compressors, all of which become critical
during times of emergency, need reliable electricity (to varying extents) to operate.
And all of these systems are important to the operation and restoration of electric
power systems. Developing policies that enhance societal resilience therefore requires
that we deeply understand the interdependencies between electric power systems and
other infrastructure systems. The interactions among power generation, the electricity transmission network, and other CI are often stressed even under normal operating
conditions. Disturbances can easily push things over the edge and trigger cascades
of failures that lead to large-scale disasters. These disturbances include earthquakes,
fires, hurricanes, wind storms, trees interacting with power lines, line icing, snow
storms, and flooding. While dependable electricity supply is already critical today,
the ongoing electrification of energy services, such as transportation and heating,
will make it even more important that we deeply understand how interdependence
impacts energy resilience.
An important example of critical interdependence is natural gas and electricity.
Natural gas generators need continuous access to gas through pipelines to generate
electricity. Many natural gas compressor stations and extraction wells require electricity to operate [138]. During times of harsh cold conditions (cold snaps) gas demand
for heating often takes priority over gas for electricity generation due to the contracts
used by natural gas generators. Especially under severe cases, cold conditions can
lead to load shedding as the only option for stabilizing the electric grid. The February
2021 Texas cold snap left 4.5 million customers without power. A primary cause of
this event was natural gas generation failing due to cold temperatures [65].
A second example is communication systems. Communication towers are usually
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powered by the electric grid, often with battery systems for backup power. While
the core communication systems used by the bulk power grid (SCADA) are typically separated from the public internet and cellular communication systems, and
have their own battery backup systems, important interdependencies remain. During
restoration of grid infrastructure, repair crews will use the public cellular networks
to communicate with coordinators. Given that backup power systems for cellular
towers can only operate for a limited time without access to grid power, there is an
interdependence that will only arise during longer outages.
Nuclear generators are naturally interdependent on electric grids, because they
require power from the grid to operate various safety systems. When power from the
grid is seen by the plant as potentially unreliable (e.g., significant voltage fluctuations), nuclear plants are designed to disconnect from the grid and use local backup
power systems to initiate a controlled plant shutdown. This creates an interdependence that can both increase the size of a blackout by removing large generators from
the supply, and the length of a blackout because once a nuclear plant initiates the
shutdown process, it can be days to weeks before it is available to generate power
again [139].
When CI systems have been damaged for extended time periods, restoring key
elements of the power grid becomes even more challenging. This was seen in Puerto
Rico after Hurricane Maria [140]. This concept, which we call compounding risk over
time, is difficult to model precisely, but is clearly present in the history of large power
grid failures, where large restoration projects become increasingly difficult as more
infrastructure systems have been out for longer periods of time, leading to complicated
and often unanticipated interactions.
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4.2.2

Paper description

The Computing Resilience of Infrastructure Simulation Platform, CRISP, used in this
paper, was initially presented in [37, 85], where it was used to evaluate transmission
system resilience as a single infrastructure including renewables. In this paper, the
CRISP framework is extended to evaluate transmission system resilience focusing on
interactions with other infrastructures. A key feature of CRISP is its use of data
collected by electric utilities about transmission (and here generation) outages to
build probability distributions. These probability distributions combine the outcomes
of the various processes involved in resilience, and sampling from these probability
distributions can efficiently reproduce the response and resilience of the power system
under stress. CRISP samples from these distributions to generate representative sets
of line/generator outages and restoration times. This allows us to consider a large
set of events caused by many different disturbances (e.g., fire, weather, human error)
as the source of disturbance without needing to explicitly model each mechanism.
CRISP then uses a grid model to track the progress of restoration and quantify the
size, duration, and risk of resilience events.
Conventional sampling methods such as Monte Carlo tend to under sample from
extreme events, resulting in either massive computing requirements or an inaccurate
estimate of the risk associated with large events [141]. To address this problem, this
paper uses stratified sampling to find the low probability, high impact events in sufficient quantity to quantify the risk. Sampling a sufficient number of large events is
already crucial to measuring the resilience of power systems, and when interdependencies between power systems and other CIs are included sampling methods become
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even more important.
This paper estimates the impact of several types of interactions and ranks them
to find the effect on the resilience of two power system networks. As a first effort to incorporate interactions into the resilience quantification methods developed
in [37, 85] these interaction models are appropriately simple. There are three specific
interaction models: communications, natural gas supply, and nuclear restorations, as
well as the more generic compounding risk over time.

4.2.3

Literature Review

The idea of measuring resilience, before its use in engineering, stems from the literature on Social-Ecological Systems, where interdependencies and the effects of different
scales are seen as critical to measuring the resilience of these complex systems [2].
The field of civil engineering pioneered frameworks for resilience of infrastructure systems [9]. As reviewed in [142], the quantification of resilience of an infrastructure
system requires measures of system performance under different stages of resilience
events, including disaster prevention, damage propagation, and recovery. Building on
this work, in 2013 the US government defined resilience as “the ability to anticipate,
prepare for, and adapt to changing conditions and withstand, respond to, and recover
rapidly from disruptions” [1]. The electrical engineering resilience literature focuses
on understanding high impact low probability events that are not considered in standard reliability assessment [6]. In addition, a number of papers have shown that it is
helpful to model resilience events using a sequence of stages, including initial failures,
propagation, and restoration [6, 31].
In order to understand resilience in power systems, we need to understand the key
79

elements of events that degrade resilience. These elements include the initial disturbance [18], which causes failures, which can then initiate cascades of outages [143,144],
which is followed by a restoration process [30]. Initiating outages are often modeled
using fragility curves, with outage probabilities that are dependent on the nature of
the external hazard [14]. Stratified sampling from utility data is applied in [145] to
represent cascading outages in the electric transmission grid after an earthquake in
order to optimize investment to harden the grid against earthquakes. Power system resilience to wind storms [29], earthquakes [9], and less frequently multiple hazards [146]
are also explored in the engineering literature.
While the resilience of interdependent CI has been studied for decades [39], much
of the problem remains open [40–42]. Several papers use multi-network models to
study interdependent CI [43, 44]. Much of the work in this field studies the cascading failure between interdependent infrastructures [45, 46]. Vulnerable components
considering the interdependence between CI are modeled in [47]. Others develop
restoration strategies for multiple interdependent CI [43, 48–50]. Specific combinations of interdependent power and other CI are being investigated, for example, by
finding the impact of specific events on interdependent communication and electricity
infrastructure [31]. There are many ongoing challenges for modeling the resilience of
these interdependent systems. For example, a review of communication systems and
power systems [51] describes several mechanisms of interdependence in the case of
smart grids and severe weather conditions that need further study. Many key interdependencies are increasing over time, such as transportation and electricity with
the growth of electric vehicles. Indeed, benchmark problems are being formulated to
encourage further research on this relationship [52]. Others are using data-based com-
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ponent failure models [53], and proposing creative ideas for utilizing interdependence
to improve resilience [54]. Interdependence between natural gas and electric transmission networks is being studied not only in resilience settings [55], but also under
normal operating conditions [56,57] to understand interconnected energy systems that
provide both heat and electricity [58]. Water and power networks are increasingly
stressed by their interdependencies and are beginning to be investigated [59].

4.2.4

Contributions

This paper presents a novel approach that ranks the impact of multiple interdependencies on the resilience of a power transmission system. In particular:
1. The paper samples from the statistics of historical transmission and generation
outage and restoration data to characterize the outcomes of outage initiation,
cascading in the grid, and restoration times. This approach works directly from
standard data already collected by utilities, and avoids many of the assumptions
needed for simulation models.
2. The paper uses stratified sampling so that high impact low frequency events
can be practically and efficiently sampled.
3. The paper ranks the resilience impact of interdependencies between electricity and gas, nuclear, and communications infrastructures, using data from the
Northeastern US and 39-bus and 6394-bus grid models.
In what follows, we present our methods in Sec. II, results in Sec. III, and conclusions in Sec. IV.
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4.3

Methods

CRISP is a novel approach that quantifies the resilience of a power system to generator
and transmission outages using a data-driven method that represents each process in
resilience events from initiating disturbances through restoration. CRISP represents
five specific processes that are important to modeling resilience events: stress leading
to initial failures, cascade of failures through the network, the post-disturbance degraded system state, restoration, and quantifying the impact of the event [37]. Each
of these processes is represented by combining real-world historical data from electric
utility systems with a power system model. After each simulation, CRISP delivers
multiple measures of event impact, including event duration (hours), event size (MW),
the number of components lost, and energy not served, ENS, (MWh). Quantitatively
describing the distribution of event duration, size, and ENS over a broad spectrum of
initiating events is a valuable way to estimate the resilience of a given power network.
CRISP models the combination of initiating outages and cascading outages by
sampling from historical transmission line and generator outage data collected and
reported by utilities. Using historical data in this way avoids the need to model
cascading outages in detail, eliminating the need to make difficult assumptions about
how particular cascading failures may propagate in a given power system [20, 147].
After sampling outages in this way, CRISP uses an optimal load shedding algorithm
(see [37]) to calculate the size of the event in total load shed (MW). Restoration is
modeled by sampling from historical data for both transmission line and generator
restoration times, and then calculating the maximum load that can be served in
each hourly time step until the system is fully restored, or 6 months have elapsed.
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Computations were performed, in part, on the Vermont Advanced Computing Center.
This section describes the data used in this paper, the statistical distributions used
for line and generator outages, the stratified sampling method, and several important
improvements made relative to previously published versions of the CRISP model.
Key among the CRISP improvements is the ability to model internal and external
interdependencies that impact power system resilience. This allows CRISP to quantify these interdependencies and to rank their impacts on power system resilience.
We use CRISP to study the impact of four types of interactions: communications,
natural gas supply, nuclear restoration, and a more abstract model of compounding
risk over time. To rank interdependencies, an initial (baseline) resilience assessment
of the power system is found through CRISP. CRISP then reassesses power system
resilience for each interaction model using the same set of events as the baseline assessment. This allows one to compare the impacts of each interaction model on power
system resilience and rank them.

4.3.1

Case studies and sources of data

This paper presents results from applying CRISP to two power system test cases
based on data from the Northeastern US. The first case study uses the network data
from the IEEE 39-bus case [148] covering New England in the US.2 The network data
for the second case study was developed from an Independent System Operator-New
England (ISO-NE) PSS/E planning model designed to represent the 2018/19 winterpeak in Vermont and covers New England and New York in the US, referred to as
2

The original IEEE 39-bus test case was updated to be N − 1 secure by increasing line power
flow limits and adding repeated lines where necessary. The modified test case has 55 lines and 10
generators and is available at [63].
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the 6394-bus NE-NY case.3
Additional generator properties, such as startup times, shutdown times, etc., are
included based on properties of the most similar generators in the 73-bus reliability
test case [137]. We collected the forced outage rates (FOR) for different generator types from [149] via [150] for temperature conditions below -15◦ C, which range
from FOR= 1.9% to FOR= 21.2%. We use Northeast Power Coordinating Council, NPCC, Generating Availability Data System, GADS, data from 2012-2015, as
reported in [151], to describe generator restoration times.
The transmission line automatic outage data describing cascade size and spread
comes from the New York Independent System Operator, NYISO, as processed from
public data in [147]. The distribution of transmission line restoration times comes
from automatic outages reported in the North American Electric Reliability Corporation’s Transmission Availability Data System (TADS) for the US Eastern interconnection [152].

4.3.2

Number of line outages after cascading

Initiating a CRISP simulation requires the probability distribution of the total number
of lines outaged after the initial outages and cascading. We fit this distribution from
the NYISO data with an empirical probability p1 = 0.664 of one line out and a Zipf
3

The original network was somewhat reduced in size by aggregating all “leaf" buses so that
the resulting model includes only buses of degree 2 and higher. The resulting network contains
6394 buses. The HVDC lines were modeled as generators (positive or negative), with the power
production/consumption limited between the operating point and the negative of that value. The
line limits were increased so that the base case produces no flows above the line rating for each N−1
contingency using a DC power flow.
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distribution (or zeta distribution) for two or more lines out, which has the form
P [k lines out] =

1 − p1 1
,
ζ(s) − 1 k s

k = 2, 3, ..., nmax

(4.1)

where the slope of the Zipf distribution on a log-log plot is −s, ζ is the Riemann zeta
function, and nmax = 1695 is the number of lines in the network. The Zipf portion of
the distribution is fit by adapting the formula in [153] to the condition k ≥ 2, giving
the estimate s = 3.59. The purpose of using the Zipf distribution is to smooth the
noisy data for large number of line outages with a plausible form of the distribution
tail. (Note that the probability of (4.1) yielding more than 1695 lines out is of order
10−9 and is therefore neglected.)
Line restoration times from Eastern Interconnect data are fit to a log-normal
probability distribution, as shown in Fig. 4.1. The resulting log-normal distribution
with parameters µ = 4.77 and σ = 2.63 is used to sample the line restoration times
for both case studies.

4.3.3

Selecting which lines outage

After selecting the number of lines out after cascading, N , CRISP next chooses which
specific lines go out by sampling from the empirical distribution of network distance
between lines in the observed cascades from NYISO data shown in Fig. 4.2. In the
first step, CRISP randomly samples one line in the network to be included in the
cascade, L1 . At each subsequent step k, such that 2 ≤ k ≤ N , CRISP samples a
distance d from the empirical distribution shown in Fig. 4.2, and randomly selects
another line Lk from the set of not-outaged lines that are a distance d from line L1 .
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Figure 4.1: Empirical distribution and log-normal fit of Eastern interconnect transmission
line restoration times from TADS data.

This line is then included in the set of lines-to-go-out, k is advanced and the process
repeats until N lines are selected.

4.3.4

Generator outages

In this paper, CRISP models generator outages based on historical generator outage
data under cold weather conditions. Specifically, we collected the forced outage rates
(FOR) for different generator types from [149] via [150] for temperature conditions
below –15◦ C, which range from FOR = 1.9% to FOR = 21.2%. Because different extreme events will have dramatically different outcomes in terms of how many
generators are out, we took the FOR data above and synthesized a broad-ranging
generator outage probability mass function (PMF) to represent the number of generators out after a cascade. The resulting PMF comes from an evenly weighted average
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Figure 4.2: Empirical distribution of network distances between all lines within a cascade
using NYISO transmission line outage data.

of 1 million binomial outage distributions from 20 evenly spaced outage rates in the
range 1.9 ≤ FOR ≤ 21.2, as shown in Fig. 4.3.4 At the start of each simulation,
CRISP samples from this PMF to determine the number of generator outages, and
then chooses the particular generators that go out using a uniform distribution.
In order to build a distribution for generator restoration times, we use log-normal
probability distributions fit to the NPCC GADS data for each of three types of
outages: startup failures, unscheduled outages, and unscheduled deratings, which are
distributed in the GADS data at 0.01%, 0.27%, and 0.72% respectively, as reported
in [151]. For each generator restoration, CRISP chooses the type of outage according
to the distribution above, and then samples the restoration time from the respective
log-normal distribution.
4
The PMF is based on the available generator FOR data. For generators with limited data such
as wind and solar we use the same PMF.
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Figure 4.3: Probability distributions of generator outages for (a) IEEE 39-bus case, and (b)
6394-bus NE-NY case.

88

4.3.5

Stratified Sampling

While large outages are rare, they contribute substantially to overall risk [154]. This
comes from the fact that the distribution of outage size measured by the number of
lines out (4.1) has a heavy tail. One consequence is that straightforward, brute force
Monte Carlo sampling of outage size is inherently ineffective because large cascades
rarely appear in these samples. Thus, brute force Monte Carlo methods require an
impractically large sample size to accurately evaluate the risk associated with large
events.
To address this issue, we sample much more uniformly across the range of cascaded
outage size. That is, instead of sampling directly from (4.1) and the generator outage
distribution, we use stratified sampling [155, ch. 8] to sample more efficiently. The
key idea is to divide the cascade sizes into bins or strata. We calculate the probability
of each bin and then use CRISP to estimate the probability of an outcome, such as
load shed of samples in each bin; that is, the load shed probability conditional on each
bin. Then the load shed probability is obtained by weighting by the bin probabilities
the probability of load shed conditional on each bin. This is described in more detail
in the following.
The cascade size is given by the number of lines out N and the number of generators out G. We choose bins B1 , B2 , ..., BK for the cascade size by specifying for each
bin the range of numbers of lines out and the range of numbers of generators out:
Bk = {Nkmin ≤ N ≤ Nkmax and Gmin
≤ G ≤ Gmax
k
k }

(4.2)

The bins partition the possible cascade sizes; that is, the bins are disjoint and they
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cover the full ranges of number of lines out from 1 to nmax and number of generators
out from 0 to gmax . The number of bins K is the product of the number of line bins
and the number of generator bins.
Since the line and generator outages are assumed independent, the probability of
each bin is easily computed from (4.1) and the generator outage distribution:
≤ G ≤ Gmax
P[Bk ] = P[Nkmin ≤ N ≤ Nkmax ] P[Gmin
k ]
k

(4.3)

Given the number of lines out N and generators out G, CRISP can evaluate a
sample of the load shed S and the ENS. Here we discuss estimating the distribution of
the load shed S since estimating the ENS is the same calculation with ENS substituted
for S. Suppose we take s samples from bin Bk and use CRISP to calculate s samples
(k)

(k)

of load shed S1 , S2 , ..., Ss(k) . Then we estimate the survival function of load shed
assuming that the cascade size is in bin Bk as
P[S > ℓ | Bk ] =

s
1X
(k)
I[Sj > ℓ]
s j=1

(4.4)

I[·] is the indicator function and the summation in (4.4) counts the number of samples
with load shed larger than ℓ. Then the survival function of load shed is given by
weighting (4.4) estimated with CRISP with the bin probabilities calculated from
(4.3):
P[S > ℓ] =

K
X

P[S > ℓ | Bk ] P[Bk ]

(4.5)

k=1

Brute force Monte Carlo corresponds to stratified sampling with only one bin
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(K = 1), and one can see how having many bins over the range of cascade sizes and
sampling equally from each bin distributes the sampling effort much more equally
across the range of cascade sizes, since sampling from only one bin will greatly oversample the common small cascades, and greatly undersample the rare large cascades
of most interest. Indeed, the stratified sampling not only reduces the variance of the
estimated quantities for the large cascades by increasing the number of large cascade
samples, but enables much rarer and larger events to be sampled. Moreover, the bin
probabilities are computed exactly from (4.3) and this also gives lower variance estimates than empirical sampling from the entire distributions. To take full advantage
of this, the bins are chosen so that the load shed does not vary too much over the
bin [155, ch. 8.4].

4.3.6

Interaction Models

A key to understanding the resilience of electric power systems is to understand the
dependence of other CIs on the electric grid and its own dependence on those CIs.
Here we describe models of several interdependencies between CI systems and the
electric power grid.
Natural Gas Pipelines
Electric and natural gas networks are interdependent in many ways. To measure the
impact of these interactions on the resilience of the power system, a probabilistic
model of the natural gas interaction with the electric grid was created. Within this
model, the natural gas delivery system (as a whole) will fail with a probability that is
equal to the ratio of the number of lines outaged N to the total number of lines in the
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electric network. If the natural gas delivery system fails, then the model samples from
a log-normal distribution with parameters µ and σ of 3 days and 1 day respectively
to find the amount of time that the natural gas power plants will go without fuel
supply.
Communication Infrastructure
This model represents interactions between the communication system and electric
system when under stress, such as the fact that electric utility repair crews may not
be able to use cellular systems during the restoration process if cell tower electricity
supplies go down and their batteries run out. The model assumes each bus with
load has a communication tower associated with it and each communication tower
has a back-up battery. The model assumes that each tower’s back-up battery has
a duration drawn from a uniform probability distribution that ranges from 4 to 24
hours. The model samples from this distribution for each load to find the battery
duration for each event. After finding the battery duration of each bus the model
finds the initial demand unserved (load shed) at each node. If there is load shedding
on that bus the probability of the tower failing is proportional to the load shed at that
bus. To model the fact that communication failures increase restoration difficulty in
the vicinity, whenever a communication tower fails; i.e., if its demand is unserved and
the battery back-up would have depleted its stored energy, the restoration times of
any lines connected to that bus increase by a factor of 1.5.
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Nuclear Restoration
Nuclear power plants have (appropriately) complicated safety procedures. This is
particularly true when there are voltage fluctuations or when “Loss of offsite power"
events occur, which typically trigger a long chain of shutdown procedures. Restoring
normal plant operations after a safety shutdown event can take days to months.
For example, a nuclear reactor can become poisoned with Xenon-136 gas if it is
disconnected from the grid and must shutdown, and it can takes days for the gas to
dissipate, which must occur before the plant restart process can begin. This nuclear
poisoning can happen during blackouts and delay restoration of the nuclear plant.
The long restoration times of nuclear plants can be seen in historical generator outage
data [151].
In CRISP, this interaction occurs any time a nuclear generator has been switched
off for three hours. If this does occur, then after the normal shutdown period, the
nuclear plant is forced to wait t hours until starting up again, where t is sampled
from the distribution of the mean time to recovery (MTTR) for nuclear generators
as found in [151].
Compounding Risk Over Time
It is well known in power system restoration that when restoration periods become
longer and critical services are still not supplied, the restoration process itself becomes
more difficult and delayed. One example is infrastructure employees being unable to
drive to work when their gas tanks are empty and filling stations do not work, or
that their cell phone batteries run out and charging is not easily available. Another
example is increased traffic delays when traffic lights do not work. There are many
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such interactions, and they may only emerge in longer and more widespread blackouts.
Sometimes such interactions are surprising and only recognized when they occur. It
is not feasible to model all the possible mechanisms of these interactions, but we
can model the overall effect in which the restoration process during long and large
events becomes increasingly severe, compounding over time. CRISP models this
compounding risk over time effect as follows: The model checks each outaged line
every 8 hours of the restoration process, and increases the restoration time by a
factor of 1.05 with a probability that is the total fraction of load shed, at the current
time step, in the local region. The local region is considered to be the nodes at either
end of the line. The factor 1.05 came from the results of an early sensitivity study,
where we found this model is very sensitive to the parameter chosen, with larger
factors leading to unrealistically huge impacts on the risk.

4.4

Results

This paper uses two different methods to describe the statistics of power system
resilience from the outputs of the CRISP model. The first method is the complementary cumulative distribution function (CCDF) of ENS over the full range of sampled
events, shown in Figs. 4.4, 4.7, 4.8, and 4.10. The CCDF allows one to see the full
range of event sizes and their relative probabilities, and to compare the various interaction models. While the CCDF is useful, it is sometimes difficult to understand
overall risk from the CCDF, which is a combination of cumulative probability and
size. Also, the tail of the CCDF has significant uncertainty, due to the relatively small
number of large events sampled and the small probabilities involved. Furthermore,
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the CCDF of ENS only describes the total energy associated with an event, which
means that short duration, large size events are viewed similarly to long duration,
small size events.
In order to view the data differently, we show a second view of resilience with the
overall risk measured as probability times impact (ENS). Blackout events of different
sizes (small, medium, large) and durations (short, medium, long) are shown as boxes
placed along coordinates of size and duration. The summed risk for each range of
size and duration is indicated by the area of the box, which is normalized by the
area of the largest box in the figure. We call this view of risk Risk Boxes, as shown
in Figs. 4.5, 4.6, and 4.9. The combination of these two methods (CCDF and Risk
Boxes) provides additional insight beyond either one of these metrics alone.
We now discuss the results for two different test cases: (1) a modified version of
the IEEE 39-bus test case [63] and (2) the 6349-bus NE-NY case.

4.4.1

IEEE 39-bus Test Case

In order to implement stratified sampling, we created one bin for each possible combination of lines out (1 to 55) and generators out (0 to 10), giving 605 bins. Stratified
sampling was then applied with 100 samples drawn from each bin.
39-bus test case results
Figs. 4.4 and 4.5 compare the 4 interactions and the base case of no interactions for the
IEEE 39-bus test case. Fig. 4.4 shows the CCDF of ENS. The small and medium ENS
events show no significant difference from the base case with no interactions, while for
some interaction models the ENS of the large events increased from the base case. Fig.
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Figure 4.4: The CCDF of ENS for the IEEE 39-bus test case for the base case and each of
the interaction models. The inset shows more detail for the distribution of large event sizes.

Figure 4.5: Risk Boxes for the IEEE 39-bus case in which the area of each box indicates the
relative risk associated with events of various sizes (MW, vertical axis) and durations (time,
horizontal axis). The threshold between small and medium sizes events is 4000MW, between
medium and large event sizes is 6000MW, between short and medium duration events is 48
hrs, and between medium and long duration events is 250 hrs.

4.5 shows the Risk Boxes for the 39-bus case with the 3 specific interaction models
and the general compounding risk over time model applied and compared with the
base case. The results clearly indicate that the Natural Gas interactions substantially
increase the risk of long events over small, medium, and large event bins. In addition,
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Figure 4.6: Risk Boxes showing parameter sensitivity analysis results for the natural gas
interaction model applied to the 39-bus test case, using the same method and thresholds as
in Fig. 4.5.

the compounding risk over time interaction substantially increases the risk of long
events of all sizes. The communication and nuclear generation interactions had little
to no impact on resilience. Furthermore, from Fig. 4.4 we can see that the nuclear
generation interaction model does not substantially impact resilience. However, there
are visible increases in the ENS of large events from the communication, natural
gas, and compounding risk interactions. The compounding risk over time interaction
clearly illustrates the potential impact of continued lengthening of restoration times
and is the most severe interaction for the 39-bus test case.
Sensitivity Analysis
Each of the interaction models has various modeling parameters that naturally impacted the outcomes from the model. Here we discuss results from sensitivity analysis
of key parameters in the interaction models for the IEEE 39-bus test case.
The assumed model parameters in the nuclear generation interaction are minimal
since that model mainly used data presented in [150]. While there was one modeling
parameter of the number of hours a nuclear plant needed to be out before this interaction could be initiated, changing that number from 3 hours to either 2 or 1 hours
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showed no effect on the results.
The communication model sensitivity analysis examined the two model parameters: the range of battery durations and the multiplication factor on the restoration
time. The range of battery durations was switched from 4 to 24 hours to 1 to 4 hours.
The 1 to 4 hour battery parameter results show that the shorter battery life made
little difference, or even slightly improved the resilience from the original battery interaction model. The other parameter in the communication model is the factor 1.5
by which the restoration times of the adjacent lines are multiplied. This factor was
increased to 1.75 and 2 for the sensitivity analysis, and both increases to this factor
decrease the resilience of the power system as expected.
The log-normal distribution used to model the natural gas supply interaction has
two parameters: µ and σ. Increases to µ or σ decreased the resilience of the power
system. As shown in Fig. 4.6, the assumed values of µ and σ did impact the results
of the study. As shown in Fig. 4.7, changes in µ and σ had the most impact on large
and small ENS event sizes for the higher probability, medium events.
We also tested various values for the parameters in the compounding risk over
time model. Changing the time parameter, set to 8 hours in the original model, by
a few hours did not have significant impact on the results. However, changing the
factor parameter, set to 1.05 in the original model, had a significant effect on this
interaction model.
Comparison With Monte Carlo Sampling
To validate and assess the performance of stratified sampling, we compared the results
from stratified sampling to conventional Monte Carlo sampling. Fig. 4.8 shows results
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Figure 4.7: CCDFs of ENS for the natural gas interaction model sensitivity analysis on the
IEEE 39-bus case for the full range of events. Inset shows detail for large events.

from stratified sampling with bins from 1 to 55 lines and 0 to 10 generators and
standard Monte Carlo sampling, both with 60 500 samples on the IEEE 39-bus case.
In order to quantify the uncertainty in each of these methods we used a bootstrapping
technique using sampling with replacement from the 60 500 samples. The results
clearly show that for small events the Monte Carlo method provides less uncertainty,
while for large events the stratified sampling method shows data for far more of the
tail in the distribution. The benefit of stratified sampling is the added range of event
size, and the trade off for that added range is lower accuracy for smaller events.
Stratified sampling allows the sampling to be deployed much more effectively across
the full range of event sizes.
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Figure 4.8: Comparison of Monte Carlo sampling and stratified sampling results for the
IEEE 39-bus case. To show the variance in each, we show 10 bootstrapping runs for each
method. The figure shows event sizes ≥ 103 MWh; the data for smaller event sizes is
identical for both methods.

Figure 4.9: Risk Boxes showing the relative risk for events of various sizes and durations of
3 specific interactions compared with the base case simulated on the 6349-bus NE-NY case,
using the same method and thresholds as in Fig. 4.5.

4.4.2

6349-bus NE-NY Case

To implement stratified sampling for the 6394-bus NE-NY case, bins were chosen
to cover a large range of line and generator outages and include rare, massive contingencies.5 The bins were selected based on the expected wide range of outcomes
5

The bins for the NE-NY case are as follows: line bins are (N min , N max ) = [(1,1), (2,2),
(3,3), (4,4), (5,10), (11,20), (21,40), (41,80), (81,100), (101,150), (151,200), (201,250), (251,300),
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Figure 4.10: CCDF of ENS for the 3 specific interaction models compared with the base
case on the 6394-bus NE-NY case. Inset shows detail for large events.

from different lines and generators being sampled. The generator outages were only
modeled up to 400 generators outaged at once considering that the probability mass
distribution shows the probability of more than 400 generators being out at once to
be very small.
Fig. 4.9 shows the Risk Boxes for the 3 specific interaction models: interdependence with communication systems, natural gas systems, and nuclear generators, as
well as a base case with no interactions. The results for the NE-NY test case clearly
show the enormous impact that a natural gas shortage could have on the system.
Most notably, the natural gas interaction substantially increases the risk associated
with long duration and large load shed events. The nuclear generation interaction
once again shows no significant effects on the risk of the power system to any size
(301,350), (351,400), (401,450), (451,500), (501,550), (551,600), (601,1695)]; and generator bins are
(Gmin , Gmax ) = [(0,0), (1,1), (2,5), (6,10), (11,20), (21,50), (51,60), (61,70), (71,80), (81,90), (91,100),
(101,130), (131,160), (161,200), (201,230), (231,260), (261,300), (301,330), (331,360), (361,400)].
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or duration of events, while the communication interaction model shows a small increase in the risk of long events of all sizes. Fig. 4.10 shows the CCDF of ENS for
each interaction over the full range of event impacts. Fig. 4.10 also shows that the
natural gas interaction ranks as the most severe in decreasing the resilience of the
power system to large events in the NE-NY case.

4.4.3

Discussion

The advantage of stratified sampling can be seen clearly in the numerous examples
of extreme events in the results. Stratified sampling captures low probability and
extremely high impact events that Monte Carlo would not find without an unreasonable amount of sampling. This is due to the simple fact that stratified sampling
samples more frequently from the extreme initiating events that are more likely to
result in large blackout events, and less frequently from smaller initiating events.
The goal of this paper is to rank the effects of interaction models on power system
resilience, and since the impact of these interactions most clearly appear in the tail of
the distributions, the use of stratified sampling in properly sampling the large events
is important. Indeed, our Risk Boxes plots suggest that increase in the large and long
event risk is a key indicator of decreased resilience.
The results in this study are presented as conditional probabilities, in which we
describe the probability of a certain event, given that at least one transmission line
is out. While the outage probability distributions are based on historical data, there
were naturally very few observations for very large initiating events, making it difficult
to accurately estimate the probabilities for the very large sets of transmission and
generator outages (such as would result from a large winter storm and/or a cascading
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blackout). The probabilities presented here should, therefore, be treated as relative
values for ranking. Nevertheless, it may be instructive to map these conditional
probabilities to annual probabilities that are more easily interpreted. In order to do
so, we first need to know how often events occur. The transmission line outage data
used here is based on 9,600 automatic line outages that occurred over 12 years, which
is 800 unplanned outages per year [147]. So for this dataset, a one in a million event
(Pr = 10−6 ) corresponds to an annual probability of 0.0008.
We found it somewhat surprising that the communication interaction model resulted in only a small reduction in system resilience, despite the fact that communication systems and electric power systems are increasingly intertwined. This is likely
the result of the fairly limited mechanisms through which communication failures
could extend power outages in our model. Future power systems, with a larger number of small, internet-connected devices, like wifi-connected, behind-the-meter DERs
and demand response programs, will be more interdependent with communication
networks and these modeling assumptions may need to be revisited.
The results of the compounding risk over time interaction model on the IEEE 39bus case surprised us, as well, with the large impacts of small compounding factors
to decrease resilience. This generic compounding risk model nicely illustrates the
potentially severe effects that the many mechanisms delaying restoration taking place
in concert can have.
Finally, in both test cases the natural gas interaction clearly ranked as the most
severe specific interaction reducing power system resilience. This sheds light on the
enormous potential social costs that could result from a long natural gas system
outage in the Northeastern US. This reliance on natural gas for a very large portion
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of electricity supply in the Northeast region is well known, and has been highlighted in
congressional testimony as a major risk [113]. Our paper gives some quantification of
this regional energy security risk and highlights the importance of identifying solutions
to this risk.

4.5

Conclusion

This paper demonstrates a new method, called CRISP, to rank the risk associated
with interdependencies between power systems and other infrastructures, based on
sampling from historical data that is commonly available to electric transmission
utilities. We used the method to model and rank the risk associated with three
specific types of interdependencies: communications, nuclear restoration, and natural
gas supply failure. Natural gas supply failure clearly ranked as the most severe specific
risk for the Northeastern US, confirming the importance of natural gas supply security
in the region. We also modeled generic interactions due to several mechanisms by
which restoration time delays can compound. The results show that compounding
risk can have a severe impact on resilience.
In order to understand the impact of interdependence on power system resilience,
it is essential that we capture low probability, high impact events. The results clearly
show that stratified sampling can describe the risk associated with low probability
events. Conventional sampling methods, such as Monte Carlo, do not sufficiently
sample from large, long-duration blackout events to accurately describe this risk.
Merely looking at small events does not capture the most significant risks.
We presented the results with Risk Boxes with box area indicating risk placed
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along dimensions of load shed and duration. Each box corresponds to risk of a range
(small, medium, large) of load shed and duration. It is useful to see the load shed
and duration of resilience events, together with the risk.
This paper suggests a number of directions that could be valuable in future work.
While we used the best data that is generally available for this region, the results
could (potentially) be made more accurate by using proprietary data and models
that utilities commonly collect. In addition, more detailed and/or data-driven models of each of these interactions could be developed. Furthermore, detailed models
of additional interdependencies, not considered in this paper, could be developed.
Transmission utilities can use their own data to model and rank interdependencies
that are of particular concern within their own systems, using the CRISP method. In
addition, future work could specifically quantify the impact of policies or technologies
that could improve resilience.
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Chapter 5
Concluding Remarks
This chapter concludes the dissertation with a summary of the findings from the
previous chapters and with future work. Chapter 1 provided the motivation for the
work performed, a literature review of relevant work, and described the gaps in the
literature that this dissertation filled. Power system resilience and decarbonization
are both interdependent with climate change. This dissertation has provided more
information on the decarbonization and resilience challenge of power systems during
the energy transition. Chapter 2 illuminated the context of the energy transition in
Vermont and provides a view of the decarbonization resilience challenge from several
scales of decision making in order to discover gaps in current incentives. This chapter
discovered that national scale transmission investments, state-led life cycle analysis
to aid coordination of land use and grid planning, microgrids along highways to
support EV charging and to provide state revenue, and regional resilience centers
with micro-grids and other access to resources to aid community members during
power outages would improve the policy packages to support decarbonization and
resilience in Vermont.
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Chapter 3 presents the Computational Resilience of Infrastructure Simulation
Platform, CRISP, which uses historical utility data combined with minimal load shedding optimizations to quantify resilience of power systems over a spectrum of events.
This chapter studies the effects of adding distributed energy resources on power system resilience, once again bridging the gap between resilience and decarbonization.
This chapter demonstrates the CRISP model with a case study on a 73-bus power
system test case, and finds there are significant benefits to the addition of energy
storage, particularly with solar PV, to the improvement of power system resilience.
Chapter 4 improved the CRISP model in several ways, particularly with the ability to rank the impact of interdependencies with other critical infrastructure on power
system resilience. This chapter quantified the potential impacts of 3 specific interaction models: natural gas supply, communication systems, and nuclear generation
restoration as well as a generic compounding risk over time. This chapter studied
the effects of a cold snap on the Northeastern US on two power system test cases, a
39-bus case and a 6394-bus case. The natural gas supply interaction within the Northeastern US power grid had a severe impact on the power system resilience, ranking
highest among the specific interaction models studied in this chapter in its impact of
decreasing power system resilience. Stratified sampling, in particular, allows CRISP
to simulate a larger set of high impact, low probability events based on the smaller
set of high impact, low probability historical events. This gives us a better measure
of the types of events that are critical for estimating the tail of the distribution of
ENS, and therefore critical to measuring resilience.
Validation of resilience models is possible, but difficult because extreme events are
very rare. Due to the limited number of extreme historical power outages, while we
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can review case studies to see if events of the same size are estimated to be a similar
probability as these real events were estimated to be. However, it doesn’t make sense
to validate to these particular events, because they’re only a few unique events. One
way that we could validate would be to create physics-based models, and validate
those models with our data. However, CRISP is built from the data used to validate
other models, and so it is self-validating.
Several avenues for future work have been identified in the previous chapters and
are listed below. Chapter 2 discussed the importance of land use planning with grid
planning efforts to place resources in the best locations to support grid reliability,
decarbonization, and resilience. Future work that studies co-optimizing Vermont’s
distribution grid, transmission grid, and land-use related resources to optimally place
solar and storage resources would benefit the energy transition studies. The event
outage data reported in this chapter could be used with distribution grid models to
quantify resilience of Vermont’s distribution grid.
Chapters 3 and 4 both use the CRISP model, which has both benefits and limitations, as discussed in the introduction. It is important to note that data-based models
limit the the number of experiments that one can undertake. For example, it is more
difficult to model experiments that harden certain components. The natural path to
measure these changes using a data-driven model would be to do this in real life and
use the data over several years to see the results. Meanwhile a physics-based model
could approximate these changes in the model for those components and measure the
impacts. As an avenue of future work, there is value in creating data-driven methods capable of these types of experiments, that are natural for physics based models,
due to the faster computational time and the fewer modeling assumptions present in
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data-driven methods. Chapters 3 and 4 assume that the ENS is proportional to the
cost of an event. Future work could include nonlinear effects in the cost estimates.
This would enable experiments on the impacts of electrification of resources, such as
heating and transportation, on the resilience of energy systems.
Chapter 3 used solar capacity factors from one location to model distributed solar. This could be improved with granular capacity factor data across the map of
the power system to better model the performance of these resources. In addition,
outage data for microgrid resources would help the CRISP model to provide a more
realistic quantification of the benefits of solar PV and of batteries on power system
resilience. Furthermore, modeling the distribution grid using outage data for distribution grid components would provide more information on the impact of these
distributed resources on overall power system resilience.
Chapter 4 explored the impacts of interdependencies with other CI on power
system resilience. Data-driven or more detailed interaction models could improve
the CRISP ranking of interdependencies on power system resilience. Also, there are
many other interdependencies that can be modeled. Better quality and more detailed
data and power system models could be used to improve the distributions of outputs.
Additionally, the performance of other CI could be measured during these events, and
estimates of the impacts on resilience of those CI from the interdependencies could
be quantified and compared with the impacts on power system resilience.
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